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A CONSUMER PROTECTION RATIONALE 
FOR REGULATION OF TAX RETURN 
PREPARERS 
PIPPA BROWDE* 
Of the 150 million tax returns filed each year, approximately fifty-six 
percent are prepared with the help of a paid preparer.  Although state-licensed 
lawyers and certified public accountants may prepare tax returns for clients, 
the vast majority of paid tax return preparers are completely unregulated.  For 
low-income taxpayers who are eligible for refundable tax credits, these 
unregulated tax return preparers do more than just fill out tax returns.  Return 
preparers who serve low-income taxpayers often also market consumer credit 
products, such as refund anticipation loans or checks.   
Government agencies and consumer advocates have documented 
widespread problems with the tax return preparer industry.  In 2011, the IRS 
promulgated regulations on tax return preparers by instituting minimum 
competency, background investigation, and continuing education 
requirements.  But in Loving v. Internal Revenue Service, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the regulations on the grounds that 
they exceeded the scope of the enabling statute.  The IRS indicated it would 
pursue a legislative fix.  In the wake of the government’s defeat in Loving, 
policy makers, scholars, and practitioners are weighing in on the question of 
how tax return preparers should be regulated.  This Article addresses a more 
fundamental question: Why should tax return preparers be regulated?   
The calls for regulations and much of the existing literature on regulating 
tax return preparers explicitly stated or implicitly assumed that regulation 
would improve tax compliance.  This Article contends that, while any 
improvement of compliance rates would be a benefit of regulation, the rationale 
for regulating tax return preparers who prepare tax returns for the working 
poor and sell consumer credit products should be to protect taxpayers as 
consumers.  In support of this proposal, this Article first describes the myriad 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana.  The 
Author wishes to thank the participants of the University of Montana Economics Department 
Scholarship Seminar and 2016 Junior Tax Scholars workshop for feedback on earlier drafts.  Professors 
Leslie Book, Monte Mills, Jon Byington, Sam Panarella, Cathay Smith, Michelle Bryan, and Anthony 
Johnstone all provided meaningful feedback.  The Author is also grateful for the excellent research 
assistance of Nick VandenBos and Kerry Heard. 
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of services provided and products sold by tax return preparers to low-income 
taxpayers.  Second, relying on empirical evidence on the relationship between 
tax return preparers and compliance, this Article challenges the rationale that 
regulation will improve compliance.  Third, and finally, this Article re-frames 
regulation as a mode of consumer protection, supported by the relationship 
among low-income taxpayers, the government, and tax return preparers and as 
a check upon the market incentives that allow for exploitation of low-income 
taxpayers.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In most states one must have a license to sell breakfast sandwiches at a 
weekend farmers’ market or to cut hair.1  Unlike the person cutting hair or 
making the egg sandwich, tax return preparers generally are allowed to prepare 
tax returns without satisfying any government regulatory requirements.2  Many 
 
1. For example, under state regulations in Montana, “mobile food establishments,” which would 
include food prepared and sold, or both, from a moveable location such as a push cart or trailer, may 
not operate without a license.  MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.110.238(1) (2015) (requiring a license to operate 
a food establishment); R. 37.110.261(15)(a) (defining mobile food establishment).  For barber and 
cosmetology licensing requirements in Montana, see R. 24.121.601 (setting forth licensing 
requirements).  In the hairstyling context, there has been considerable controversy about the scope of 
the licensing requirement.  See, e.g., Chi-Chi Zhang, Hair Braider Says Utah Cosmetology Law is 
Unfair, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700131619/Hair-
braider-says-Utah-cosmetology-law-is-unfair.html [https://perma.cc/BDV8-T8BE]. 
2. There are four states that regulate tax return preparers: Oregon, California, Maryland, and 
New York.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 673.615 (2017); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22253 (West 2017); 
MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 21-501 (LexisNexis 2017); N.Y. TAX LAW § 32(b)(1) (Consol. 
2017); see also Megan L. Brackney, State Regulation of Tax Return Preparers, 94 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 208 (2015) (providing further analysis regarding the four states that regulate tax return 
preparers).  Some professionals who prepare tax returns, such as certified public accountants (CPAs) 
and attorneys, must pass certification exams, obtain state licensing, satisfy continuing education 
requirements, and are subject to sanctions for unethical practices.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-50-
302, 305 (2015); MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.201.501–503, 2106 (2016); N.M. CODE R. § 16.60 (LexisNexis 
2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 673.010–075, 165 (2015); In re Petition to Adopt Amended Rules for 
Admission to the Bar of Montana, No. AF 11-0244 (Mont. Jan. 13, 2013); N.M.R.A. 15-101–406 
(2013); SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OR., RULES FOR ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS (2017).  An 
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of these return preparers also sell ancillary consumer credit products to the 
people whose tax returns they prepare.  The ancillary credit products usually 
have high rates of interest or are of a predatory nature.3   
Imagine a single mother who works a low-paying job and struggles to make 
ends meet.4  Assume she is eligible to receive $5,500 in government subsidies 
via refundable tax credits, all administered through the tax system.  She goes to 
an unlicensed tax return preparer.  The fee structure for the return preparation 
is not transparent and she does not know what it will cost to have the return 
prepared.  She does not have the money to pay for the return to be prepared, 
she is struggling to pay her bills and she needs a new car.  With no money down, 
the return preparer calculates her expected refund and prepares the tax return.  
She enters an arrangement with the preparer for the fee to be taken out of her 
anticipated refund.  The preparer might offer her a short-term loan with a high 
rate of interest to accelerate the receipt of the refund.  The preparer might be a 
used-car dealership that offers tax services to its customers and the preparer 
encourages her to apply her anticipated tax refund to a used car.  She can take 
the car today, and for a significant fee, use the potential refund as a down 
payment.  Either way, she leaves the preparer’s office having filed her tax 
return, forgoing a significant portion of the $5,500 she is entitled to receive.  
Though nothing came out of her pocket, it may cost her $750 or more in fees 
for deferred payment of the services, loan fees, and interest, reducing the 
amount of her tax refund.   
Assume further that the return preparer made errors on the tax return 
resulting in too much money issued as a refund to the taxpayer.  Whether the 
errors were intentional or not, a taxpayer bears the ultimate responsibility for 
the tax owed, including any amount erroneously issued to the taxpayer.  If the 
IRS takes enforcement action to correct the errors, the taxpayer must repay the 
erroneously issued refund.5   
 
obvious concern with tax return preparers is that they have access to sensitive information such as 
Social Security numbers, financial statements, and wage and tax statements belonging to their clients. 
3. See infra Section II.A.3. 
4. This example is fictitious, but it is based on the Author’s experience working as a general tax 
attorney for the IRS Office of Chief Counsel in the Small Business/Self-Employed Division in New 
York, NY and Sacramento, CA from 2008–2012.  In working on cases involving eligibility for 
refundable tax credits, the Author would routinely hear taxpayer stories regarding a taxpayer’s 
interaction with a tax return preparer.   
5. See infra Section II.B.2.  This example assumes the IRS issues the refund.  Some enforcement 
occurs before a refund is issued and the claimed refund is not issued.  For example, to minimize or 
prevent identity theft-related fraud, the IRS utilizes strategies to engage in “pre-refund fraud 
detection.”  See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 25.25.1.1 [hereinafter I.R.M.].  The pre-refund 
detection is accomplished through collection and analysis of data.  Id. § 25.25.1.2. 
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Most tax return preparers do not engage in predatory practices or intend to 
harm the customers they serve.  The tax administration system, however, does 
not ensure that unscrupulous preparers will always face the penalties under the 
law, which allows preparers the latitude to engage in deceptive or unfair 
practices.6   
Regulation of professionals is usually justified on grounds that it ensures 
public safety and protects consumers.7  For instance, the food worker selling 
breakfast sandwiches has to cook the food to established temperatures to ensure 
the customer eating the sandwich does not get sick, not in order to minimize 
costs to the medical system for treating food borne illness.  By comparison, the 
discussion of regulating preparers has focused on how regulation might 
improve tax compliance, not how regulation might protect individual taxpayers 
who ultimately bear most of the risk with respect to bad actor preparers.8  The 
direct purpose of the regulation of the food preparation and haircutting 
industries is to protect consumers,9 though there may be indirect benefits to 
society of reduction of costs to the medical system. 
 
6. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
7. Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and 
the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 724–25 (2005).  The 
civil justice system is also intended to protect consumers.  See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO 
HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL 30–32 (2013) (explaining the tension 
between free market theorists and proponents of occupational regulation).  Valid and effective 
occupational regulation ought to balance the need to protect consumers against potential negative 
consequences to the economic market because, often, regulation serves to create barriers to entry and 
protect existing industry players without a corresponding benefit that protects consumers from bad 
actors.  An excellent recent example of the protectionist underpinnings of some professional service 
regulation is the case of the state of Utah denying an individual woman’s request to operate an African-
style hair braiding business without obtaining a cosmetology license that would require 2,000 hours of 
training, cost between $9,000 and $19,000, and teach little or nothing about African hair braiding.  See 
Zhang, supra note 1; see also Jacob Goldstein, So You Think You Can Be a Hair Braider?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (June 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/so-you-think-you-can-be-a-
hair-braider.html [https://perma.cc/UF2Y-44V2]. 
8. See, e.g., Sagit Leviner, The Role Tax Preparers Play in Taxpayer Compliance: An Empirical 
Investigation with Policy Implications, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1079 (2012); Jay A. Soled & Kathleen 
DeLaney Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 151 (2017). 
9. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-50-103 (2015) (authorizing the MT Department of Labor 
and Industry to adopt rules relating to the licensing of retail food establishments for the purpose of 
protecting public health); id. § 37-31-103 (stating that the purpose of regulating the barber and 
cosmetology industry is to protect public health and safety from unqualified practitioners); Zhang, 
supra note 1. 
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While improving compliance in tax administration is a worthy goal, I 
suggest the problem should be re-framed.10  This Article makes the case that 
regulation of tax return preparers who prepare returns for the working poor is a 
matter of consumer protection.  Return preparers who prepare returns for low-
income taxpayers, and who often sell consumer credit products in conjunction 
with the return preparation, should be regulated.  This Article makes three 
important contributions.  First, it examines the full spectrum of services 
provided to low income taxpayers by return preparers.  Second, this Article 
criticizes the traditional rationale for regulation of the return preparation 
industry to improve compliance.  This critique is based on empirical work 
studying the connection between tax return preparers and compliance; the goal 
of regulation for compliance does not adequately address all of the potential 
harms that unscrupulous preparers may cause.  Third, this Article re-frames the 
argument in favor of regulation as an issue of consumer protection.  The 
rationale of consumer protection is based on the triangular relationship that 
exists between the taxpayer, the government, and the return preparers and the 
market incentives that allow for low-income taxpayers to be exploited by return 
preparers.   
This Article proceeds in the following manner: Part II describes the role 
preparers have in the tax system with respect to the administration of refundable 
credits for the working poor and as providers of consumer credit products.  Part 
II also examines the compliance problems associated with return preparers and 
the history of attempts to regulate the industry.  Part III addresses the traditional 
premise that regulation of return preparers will improve compliance, in 
particular the assumption that regulation will reduce errors with respect to the 
refundable tax credits available to the working poor.  In challenging the 
traditional rationale for regulation, this Article explains the concept of 
voluntary compliance, the tax gap, and considers data on the impact return 
preparers have on compliance and the tax gap.  Part IV makes the positive 
contribution that the rationale for regulation of the return preparation industry 
should be reframed to be a matter of consumer protection; it also highlights the 
diverging incentives of tax return preparers by analyzing the triangular 
relationship between taxpayers, tax return preparers, and the government, and 
 
10. Framing matters for two reasons.  First, the objectives of regulation should be clear to 
carefully tailor the regulatory scheme itself, thus preventing overbroad regulations.  Second, in the 
particular area of the administration of tax benefits to the working poor, framing is especially important 
because there are competing policy objectives.  The prevailing view ought to be helping low-income 
taxpayers access benefits rather than enforcement of compliance.  It is my hope that this argument in 
favor of reframing sparks further conversation as to how regulation of the tax return preparation 
industry can achieve the goals of protecting taxpayers as consumers. 
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the important informational asymmetries that contribute to market incentives 
to exploit taxpayers.   
II. THE TAX RETURN PREPARATION INDUSTRY, LOW-INCOME TAXPAYERS, 
COMPLIANCE, AND PRIOR REGULATIONS 
This Part provides the necessary background on the tax return preparer 
industry.  In particular, it examines the role the tax return preparation industry 
has in the administration of refundable credits for the working poor and in the 
sale of consumer credit products to the taxpayers.  This Part also describes 
widespread problems associated with the tax return preparation industry and 
the history of prior attempts to regulate the industry.   
A. Role of Tax Return Preparers in the Tax Administration System 
Tax return preparers are a critical player in the functioning of our tax 
administration system.  The majority of taxpayers rely on tax return preparers 
to assist in return preparation, and taxpayers trust their preparers to be 
competent.11  Use of return preparers is widespread among taxpayers of all 
income levels.12  This Article focuses on the use of return preparers by low-
income taxpayers who qualify for refundable credits intended to be anti-poverty 
measures.  As shown below, many of these low-income taxpayers also purchase 
ancillary credit products from their tax return preparers.   
 
11. See Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation, 139 TAX 
ANALYSTS 767, 767, 770 (2013). 
12. The role of tax return preparers depends in large part on the financial condition of the 
taxpayer the preparer serves.  Some general literature on tax return preparers and the regulation of the 
industry focuses on the preparers role in reducing the amount of tax paid by taxpayers with higher 
income.  See generally Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., It’s About Time: Registration and Regulation Will Boost 
Competence and Accountability of Paid Tax Preparers, 31 VA. TAX REV. 471 (2012).  Other 
scholarship addresses the role of tax return preparers with respect to low-income taxpayers claiming 
refundable credits.  See, e.g., Leslie Book, Study of the Role of Preparers in Relation to Taxpayer 
Compliance with Internal Revenue Laws, in 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 
TO CONGRESS 44 (2007) [hereinafter Book, Study of the Role of Preparers]; Leslie Book, Refund 
Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85 (2009) [hereinafter Book, Refund 
Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap]; Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of 
Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1103, 1115–17 (2006) 
[hereinafter Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring]. 
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1. Types of Tax Return Preparers and What They Do 
A common complaint of the United States tax system is that preparing one's 
tax return is too complicated.13  Tax return preparers assist American taxpayers 
by preparing and filing tax returns,14 and provide necessary assistance to 
individuals who either choose not to, or feel they cannot, navigate the 
complexities of the tax laws without help.15  Of the approximately 150 million 
individual income tax returns filed each year, roughly 80 million are prepared 
with the help of a paid tax return preparer.16  While low-income taxpayers are 
likely to use a preparer because they believe they lack the ability to prepare the 
return themselves, they also choose to pay a return preparer because they 
believe the preparer may increase the amount of refund or accelerate the refund 
through the sale of a credit product.17   
 
13. JOEL SLEMROD AND JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 
OVER TAXES 3 (4th ed. 2008) (“For many, complying with our labyrinthine tax regulations is 
frustrating, costly and intrusive.”).  Slemrod and Bakija debunk the notion that the tax code is too 
complex.  Approximately 45 percent of all taxpayers, especially low-income taxpayers, “spend fewer 
than 10 hours per year on their taxes.”  See id. at 4. 
14. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701–15 (2017) (“A tax return preparer is any person who prepares for 
compensation, or who employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, all or a substantial 
portion of any return of tax or any claim for refund of tax under the Internal Revenue Code (Code).”). 
15. See Leviner, supra note 8, at 1087–88 (documenting reasons why taxpayers use return 
preparers, such as lack of taxpayer understanding of filing requirements; taxpayer lack of time and 
patience; belief that preparer can minimize tax liability and maximize refunds; and potentially reducing 
the probability of an audit); see also Olson, supra note 11, at 767, 770.  According to the NCLC, filing 
a tax return is likely “the most critical financial interaction,” an individual has with the government 
each year.  Brief for Amici Curiae Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. and Nat’l Cmty. Tax Coal. in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants and Arguing for Reversal of the District Court at 4, Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 
1013 (2014) (No. 13-5061), 2013 WL 1386247, at *4 [hereinafter Amici Curiae in Support of 
Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. IRS].  
16. Protecting Taxpayers From Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th Cong. 5, 7 (2014) [hereinafter Koskinen, Protecting Taxpayers] (statement 
of John A. Koskinen, Comm’r, IRS).  Former IRS Commissioner Koskinen, in his written statement, 
wrote that “[e]ach year, paid preparers are called upon by taxpayers to complete about 80 million 
returns, or about 56 million of the total individual income tax returns filed, while another 34 percent 
of taxpayers use tax preparation software, for a total of 90 percent who seek some form of assistance.”  
Id. at 131 (written testimony of John A. Koskinen, Comm’r, IRS)).  It was estimated that, in tax year 
2011, 81.2 million (or 56 percent) of individual tax returns were filled out by a paid preparer.  U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED 
STUDY, PREPARERS MADE SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 8 (2014). 
17. See Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 12, at 1115–16.  Tax-time 
refund products have gone through a death and resurgence.  See Leslie Book, New Report Discusses 
the Rebirth of Refund Loans, PROCEDURALLY TAXING BLOG (April 4, 2017) 
http://procedurallytaxing.com/new-report-discusses-the-rebirth-of-refund-loans/ 
[https://perma.cc/S49C-KAR6] [hereinafter Book, Rebirth of Refund Loans]. 
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Paid tax return preparers are categorized into three general groups of 
practitioners.  The first group is comprised of professionals who are state 
licensed, such as certified public accountants (CPAs) and attorneys.18  CPAs 
and attorneys are licensed after meeting educational requirements and 
undergoing examination of both competency and character.19  The second 
group is comprised of so-called enrolled agents.20  Enrolled agents, though not 
professionally licensed by any state, are regulated by the federal government 
and must demonstrate competency in tax matters, demonstrate compliance with 
the agent’s tax obligations, and meet ethical standards and continuing education 
obligations.21  The third group of tax return preparers, “unregulated tax return 
preparers” or “unregulated preparers,” unlike enrolled agents or CPAs and 
attorneys, are completely unregulated and encompass all remaining paid 
preparers.22  Unregulated preparers may prepare tax returns for a fee but are not 
required to have any minimum education or expertise and are not subject to 
background checks or ethical competencies.23  Of the nearly 80 million returns 
prepared by preparers, over half are prepared by unregulated tax return 
preparers.24  In 2009, the IRS estimated that there were approximately 43,000 
enrolled agents, 650,000 CPAs (as of 2006), and 1.2 million attorneys who 
 
18. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a) (2017) (attorneys); id. § 10.3(b) (certified public accountants). 
19. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN R. 24.201.2106 (2016); N.M. CODE. R. § 16.60.3.15 (LexisNexis 
2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 673.165 (2015); MONT. SUPREME CT., RULES FOR CONTINUING LEGAL 
EDUCATION RULE 4 (2013); N.M. SUPREME CT., MCLE RULES ART. 2 § 18-201 (2011); SUPREME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF OR., RULES FOR ADMISSION OF ATTORNEYS 8.21 (2017). 
20. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(c) (enrolled agents). 
21. Id. §§ 10.4(a) (eligibility to become enrolled agent), 10.5(d)(1) (compliance and suitability 
checks), 10.6 (renewal process for enrolled agent). 
22. See infra Section II.C.1 (discussing the IRS’s attempts to regulate the third group of 
preparers).  Circular 230 still contains the regulations to that effect, 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.3(f), 10.4(c), 10.5, 
but the regulations have been struck down.  See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1021–22 (D.C. Cir. 
2014).  There have been empirical studies on the quality of tax returns prepared by various paid (and 
unpaid) preparers.  See infra at Sections II.B.1.  See generally infra IV.B.2 (discussing informational 
asymmetries and its impact on quality of services). 
23. IRS, RETURN PREPARER REVIEW 8, 35 (2009).   
24. John A. Koskinen, Regulation of Tax Return Preparers, in 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 61, 61 (2013).  Approximately 22 million individual tax returns are 
prepared by CPAs, another approximately 12 million are prepared by other state regulated preparers 
such as enrolled agents, actuaries and state regulated return preparers, and fewer than 900,000 are 
prepared by attorneys.  Id. at 62. 
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prepared returns.25  In the absence of official registries, the number of 
unregulated preparers is unknown.26   
Among unregulated tax return preparers there is tremendous variety in 
terms of sizes and types of businesses engaged in preparing returns.  These 
businesses can be divided into two general categories: (1) Businesses whose 
primary purpose is to provide products and services related to the tax 
preparation industry and (2) Businesses where preparation of returns is 
ancillary to their primary business purpose.27  Among the first category of 
businesses whose primary business is related to the preparation of tax returns, 
there is variety itself in terms of size of operation.  Tax return businesses vary 
in size from solo practitioners to medium-size firms to large, national chains.28   
The second category of preparers, businesses in which return preparation is 
secondary or ancillary to the primary business, are often referred to as fringe 
return preparers.  Fringe preparers are primarily engaged in the business of 
selling consumer products and they offer tax return preparation services as a 
way to entice customers.29  Fringe preparers usually offer customers the option 
to finance the purchase of goods sold by the preparer by the anticipated tax 
refund.30  Examples of fringe preparers include car dealerships; check cashing 
and payday lenders; pawnshops and rent-to-own stores; and other fee-based 
 
25. IRS, supra note 23, at 9 fig.2. 
26. Id. (unknown estimate); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
270 (Dec. 31, 2003) (estimating the number from 300,000 to 600,000 for tax year 2001).  Even if 
NTA’s numbers were accurate, the increase in use of tax return preparers suggests the numbers must 
be adjusted upward.  See Leviner, supra note 8, at 1090.   
27. See Regulation of Federal Tax Return Preparers: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
and Means Subcomm. on Oversight, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) [hereinafter Olson, Tax Return Preparers] 
(written statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate).  The defining feature of fringe 
preparers is that they are “not engaged primarily in the business of preparing taxes.”  Id. 
28. Three major national chains, Jackson Hewitt, H&R Block and Liberty Tax are the largest tax 
return preparer chains in the country.  See CHI CHI WU & CHANTAL HERNANDEZ, NAT’L CONSUMER 
LAW CTR., MINEFIELD OF RISKS: TAXPAYERS FACE PERILS FROM UNREGULATED PREPARERS, LACK 
OF FEE DISCLOSURE, AND TAX-TIME FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 15–16 (2016); see also Protecting 
Taxpayers From Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
113th Cong. 49 (2014) [hereinafter Alban, Protecting Taxpayers] (written statement of Dan Alban, 
Attorney, Inst. for Justice).  Size of return preparation business is relevant.  Under the IRS’s prior 
attempt to regulate the industry under the 2011 regulations, the larger chain operations did not oppose 
the regulations whereas smaller businesses, like the plaintiffs in the Loving case, argued they were less 
able to absorb the costs of regulation that the larger chains were more able to absorb.  See infra notes 
133–38 and accompanying text. 
29. See WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 18–19. 
30. See, e.g., id. at 21. 
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providers.31  Taxpayers using a fringe preparer may be able to purchase goods, 
such as a used car or furniture, with no money down after assigning the 
customer’s anticipated tax refund to the fringe preparer.32  
In addition to paid tax return preparers, some taxpayers rely on unpaid tax 
return preparers that have been exempt from prior attempts to regulate the 
industry.  Free tax preparation services available to low-income taxpayers 
include the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) program and the Tax 
Counseling for the Elderly (TCE) program.33  Still other taxpayers rely on 
friends and family to prepare their returns for free.34   
 
31. Id. at 18–19 (providing examples of fringe preparers); id. at 21 (discussing “First Quarter 
Tax Max Marketing Program,” a program for auto dealers marketed by TRS Refund Services, which 
allows for car dealers to both boost auto sales by allowing customers to apply tax refunds toward the 
purchase of a vehicle and generate profits from the preparation of the return, plus interest and fees); 
see infra Section II.A.3 (discussing the financial products businesses use to encourage spending and 
fees generated on products themselves).   
32. See WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 1, 20–21. 
33. Free Tax Return Preparation for Qualifying Taxpayers, IRS 
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/free-tax-return-preparation-for-you-by-volunteers 
[https://perma.cc/NBA9-FK5V] (last updated Oct. 30, 2017) (stating that TCE and VITA programs 
are offered nation-wide at community centers, libraries, and schools; both volunteer programs are 
funded by grants from the IRS budget).  VITA offers free tax preparation services to taxpayers who 
earn $54,000 or less, individuals with disabilities, and taxpayers who have limited English-speaking 
skills.  Id.  VITA is staffed by volunteers who receive training in basic income tax preparation from 
the IRS.  Id.  This raises the obvious question, if VITA requires training and annual re-certification for 
a volunteer to prepare tax returns for free, why does the system allow paid tax return preparers to do 
so without required training?  TCE services are also offered to provide free tax help for all taxpayers, 
but particularly for those over the age of 60, with an emphasis on tax issues relating to pensions and 
retirement-related concerns, and TCE providers also receive training from the IRS.  See id.  “More 
than 90,000 volunteers at 12,057 Volunteer Income Tax Assistance and Tax Counseling for the Elderly 
sites assisted more than 3.6 million taxpayers during the 2015 Filing Season.”  Karen Kraushaar, The 
IRS Needs to Adhere to Procedures to Assess its Volunteer Tax Return Preparation Program 
Accurately, U.S. TREASURY (June 29, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/press/press_tigta-2016-
18.htm [https://perma.cc/5X4D-QGL4].  See generally Ezra Levin & Shervan Sebastian, 
Strengthening VITA to Boost Financial Security at Tax Time & Beyond, PROSPERITY NOW (June 2016) 
https://prosperitynow.org/files/resources/06-2016_VITA_tax_policy_brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2JE-TBSG]. 
34. According to a survey of American taxpayers, roughly 10.9% of taxpayers get a friend or 
family member to help file their taxes.  Elyssa Kirham, 43% of Americans File Taxes From the Comfort 
of Their Home, Survey Finds, GO BANKING RATES (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://www.gobankingrates.com/personal-finance/43-percent-americans-file-taxes-comfort-home-
survey-finds/ [https://perma.cc/T4FG-5J33].  One can also file for free by using “IRS Free File,” which 
“is a partnership between the IRS and the Free File Alliance, a group of industry-leading private-sector 
tax preparation companies that have agreed to provide free commercial online tax preparation and 
electronic filing.”  About the Free File Program, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/about-the-free-file-
program [https://perma.cc/9DD9-ZZ3H] (last updated Nov. 29, 2017) (internal citation omitted).  Free 
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2. Tax Return Preparers Facilitate Low- and Lower-Income Taxpayer’s 
Access to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
Paid tax return preparers have a unique role in the tax administration 
system.  Paid preparers, especially otherwise unregulated preparers, help low-
income taxpayers access social welfare benefits administered through the tax 
system.  Since the mid-1990s, a majority of federal social welfare benefits are 
administered through the tax system via refundable credits such as the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), and to a lesser degree child tax credits.35  The EITC 
represents “the nation’s largest anti-poverty program.”36  Taxpayers eligible for 
the EITC “are often the least educated and least financially sophisticated in the 
U.S. today.”37   
With the expansion of refundable tax credits aimed as anti-poverty 
measures, the relationship between the IRS and the intended recipients of 
government assistance has changed.38  The expansion of tax-based welfare 
shifts from a government determined eligibility to a private, market driven 
industry, which acts as the intermediary to assist taxpayers to claim eligibility.39  
The shift in delivery of government benefits is perhaps one of the most 
significant factors driving demand for otherwise unregulated tax return 
 
File Software is available to taxpayers with income equal to $64,000 or less and Free File Fillable 
Forms if taxpayer’s income is greater than $64,000.  See id.   
35. See generally Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 12, at 1110 
(providing background on the history of the EITC and the tax system). 
36. Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 49.  Despite the complexities detailed 
in this Article with respect to the proliferation of the tax return preparer industry and the credit products 
return preparers sell, there are some policy justifications for switching from means-based welfare to 
welfare distributed to low-income reporting workers.  See Leslie Book, Bureaucratic Oppression and 
the Tax System, 69 TAX LAW. 567, 573–74 (2016) [hereinafter Book, Bureaucratic Oppression and 
the Tax System].  Distribution of welfare through the tax system has support for two main reasons: (1) 
it lessens the stigma associated with means-based welfare and (2) it is administratively simpler for the 
government.  Id. at 573; see also Anne Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of 
Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 533 (1995). 
37. Olson, supra note 11, at 769. 
38. Book, Bureaucratic Oppression and the Tax System, supra note 36, at 573.  The U.S. tax law 
and administrative system has long played a role in social and economic goals.  See id. at 573, 575.  
However, in describing barriers low income taxpayers face in obtaining government benefits to which 
they are entitled, Professor Book notes that “the advent of the use of refundable credits in the tax 
system has fundamentally changed the relationship between the Service and those who increasingly 
depend on the tax system to meet basic needs.”  Id. at 573. 
39. See Olson, Tax Return Preparers, supra note 27, at 2.  The emergence of paid preparers other 
than CPAs and attorneys directly correlates with the expansion of the EITC.  See id.  The advent of 
electronic tax return filing, also in the early 1990s, triggered more demand for paid preparers as 
taxpayers without access to the internet could obtain their refunds more quickly.  See id.   
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preparers.40  With the increase in demand for return preparers by low-income 
taxpayers, a parallel market for consumer credit products has emerged.41   
The majority of taxpayers claiming EITC benefits rely on the services of 
tax return preparers or use of commercial tax software and many purchase 
consumer credit products sold from their preparers.42  These taxpayers may 
perceive the fees paid for return preparation and credit products as a cost to 
access the government benefits to which they are entitled.43  The cost of return 
preparation to EITC beneficiaries has been described as “a hidden 
administrative cost of the EITC program,” which reduces the net benefits 
received by low-income taxpayers.44   
While it is true that most tax return preparers do not engage in practices that 
hurt taxpayers, troubling statistics on fraudulent refund claims and the EITC 
call into doubt the accuracy and intentions of tax return preparers who serve the 
working poor.45  Returns claiming the EITC are perhaps the single biggest 
 
40. See Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 12, at 1115–17, 1115 n.77, 
1116 nn.78–79. 
41. Id. 
42. See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RIDDLED RETURNS: HOW ERRORS AND 
FRAUD BY PAID TAX PREPARERS PUT CONSUMERS AT RISK AND WHAT STATES CAN DO 3 & n.1, 5 
(2014) [hereinafter WU, RIDDLED RETURNS]; Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 156 & n.29 (citing 
Koskinen, Protecting Taxpayers, supra note 16).  About 21.6 million consumers obtained a refund 
anticipation check (“RAC”) in 2014, with the vast majority being “low-income,” CHI CHI WU & 
MICHAEL BEST, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TAXPAYER BEWARE: UNREGULATED TAX PREPARERS 
AND TAX-TIME FINANCIAL PRODUCTS PUT TAXPAYERS AT RISK 4 (2015) [hereinafter WU & BEST, 
TAXPAYER BEWARE], paying a “minimum of $648 million in RAC fees” and “another estimated $200 
million in add-on fees.”  Id. at 1.   
43. See Olson, Tax Return Preparers, supra note 27, at 2.  According to a survey conducted by 
The National Society of Accountants in 2016 and 2017, “the average fee to prepare and file a simple 
Form 1040 (with no itemized deductions) and a state tax return is $176.”  Ray Martin, A Taxpayer’s 
Guide to Tax-Prep Fees, CBS NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-taxpayers-
guide-to-tax-prep-fees/ [https://perma.cc/4TFL-FLBD]. 
44. See Alstott, supra note 36, at 590. 
45. See IRS, supra note 23, at 6, 13–17.  In 2009, the IRS estimated “that there are between 
900,000 and 1.2 million paid return preparers,” including state regulated preparers such as attorneys 
and CPAs, but the number of otherwise unregulated return preparers is unknown.  Id. at 8, 9 fig.2.  
Compliance studies show that when it comes to tax benefits for the working poor, unregulated return 
preparers incorrectly prepare returns.  See id. at 13–17 (citing Government Accountability Office 
studies that a half of the return preparers in mystery shopper reviews incorrectly reported that the 
GAO’s shopper was entitled to two children for the EITC when the shopper was only entitled to the 
credit for one child).  The Return Preparer Review also cited a Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration study in which errors were documented on the EITC, child tax credit, filing status and 
dependency exemptions.  Id. at 16 fig.5.   
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source of fraudulent refund claims.46  Furthermore, “data suggests that close to 
one-third” of all claims for the EITC are claimed in error.47  These statistics 
have sparked inquiry into the cause and nature of the errors.  Researchers 
examine whether the high error rate is driven by return preparer misconduct, 
taxpayer misconduct, or a combination of both.48  The answer remains 
unresolved, but the fact that the EITC has a much higher error rate than 
traditional means-based welfare programs where eligibility is determined by 
the government instead of claimed by a taxpayer on a return, has triggered 
political energy toward enforcement to reduce errors.49   
3. Tax Return Preparers as Consumer Credit Providers 
For many taxpayers who seek the assistance of a tax return preparer to claim 
their EITC benefits, the filing of the return is the first of several possible 
financial services sought from a tax return preparer.50  Some taxpayers who 
qualify for the EITC cannot afford to wait for their refund, and many do not 
have cash available to pay for the return preparation itself.51  Some taxpayers 
do not have access to the banking system in the first place.52  Tax return 
 
46. WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, at 1.  The NCLC estimates that approximately sixty 
percent of EITC claimants (16 million returns) use unregulated tax preparers.  Id. at 2; see Book, 
Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, supra note 12, at 1117 (2006) (noting that approximately fifty-
seven percent of erroneously claimed EITC credits were attributable to returns prepared by paid 
preparers). 
47. Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 49. 
48. See id. 
49. See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1881 (2005).  For error rates among lower-income taxpayers claiming 
the EITC, broken down by return preparers, see IRS, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR THE EARNED 
INCOME TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 2006–2008 RETURNS 26 (2014) [hereinafter IRS, COMPLIANCE 
ESTIMATES FOR EITC CLAIMED ON 2006–2008 RETURNS]. 
50. See Book, Refund Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap, supra note 12, at 99 (“[T]he tax 
preparation industry as a whole has become . . . ‘a vehicle for cross-marketing of non-tax goods and 
services.’” (quoting Tax Return Preparation Options for Taxpayers: Hearing Before the S. Finance 
Comm., 109th Cong. 149 (Apr. 4, 2006) (written statements of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer 
Advocate))). 
51. See Andrew T. Hayashi, The Effects of Refund Anticipation Loans on the Use of Paid 
Preparers and EITC Take-Up 9 (Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2016-9, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2801591 [https://perma.cc/PM5N-MSA4], for a discussion of factors in 
triggering demand for refund loans, including allowing low-income taxpayers the ability to borrow 
the cost of tax preparation.  Historical data shows that the majority of taxpayers who sought RALs 
are lower-income and claim the EITC.  See Book, Refund Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap, supra 
note 12, at 86. 
52. See Michael S. Barr and Jane K. Dokko, Third-Party Tax Administration: The Case of Low- 
and Moderate-Income Households, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 963, 964 (2009) (finding one reason 
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preparers often provide ancillary credit products to allow taxpayers quicker 
access to their anticipated refunds at high cost to the taxpayer.53  These products 
include Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs) and Refund Anticipation Checks 
(RACs) and the ability to apply an anticipated refund to a host of consumer 
goods.54  Preliminary reports indicate that more than 1.5 million RALs were 
issued by March 2017, and IRS data shows that 18.8 million taxpayers obtained 
RACs in 2015.55   
Many of these high-cost credit products have seemingly analogous non-tax 
counterparts such as payday loans.56  The key distinction of these ancillary 
financial products is their connection to the tax system.57  Repayment of these 
loans is achieved not by the taxpayer/debtor directly.  Instead, the loans are 
repaid by the government, as a cut of the welfare benefits through the tax 
system.58  This has distortive effects to the taxpayer as a consumer of these 
products.59   
Taxpayers who are at low or lower income levels are much more likely to 
rely on these ancillary financial products,60 probably because they have no 
 
for use of return preparers is lack of access to banking system); see also Hayashi, supra note 51, at 10–
11. 
53. See IRS, supra note 23, at 10. 
54. Id.  Fringe preparers can use return preparation as a tool to attract customers and allow 
customers to purchase goods on credit based on the anticipated refund.  See WU & BEST, TAXPAYER 
BEWARE, supra note 42, at 17–18.  For example, TRS Tax Max, self-proclaimed largest electronic 
filer for the retail industry, markets return preparation services to retailers to allow retailers to “receive 
a portion of [the] customer’s refund within 24 hours!”  See Benefits, TRS TAX MAX, 
https://www.taxmax.com/TRSTaxMax/Benefits.aspx [https://perma.cc/K4YY-E5YS] (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2017).  TRS Tax Max specifically markets to car dealers, allowing customers to have their 
tax return prepared at the dealership and the prospective refund to be applied to the purchase price of 
the vehicle.  See WU & BEST, TAXPAYER BEWARE, supra note 42, at 18. 
55. CHI CHI WU & MICHAEL BEST, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BIG CHANGES BURDEN 
TAXPAYERS: NEW LAW DELAYS REFUNDS, DRIVES DEMAND FOR LOANS; IMMIGRANT TAXPAYERS 
FACE CHALLENGES 3, 5 (2017) [hereinafter WU & BEST, BIG CHANGES BURDEN TAXPAYERS]. 
56. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 5:6, at 
368 (2015–16 ed.).  
57. Compare IRS, supra note 23, at 10 (discussing refund settlement products), with PRIDGEN 
& ALDERMAN, supra note 56, at 368 (discussing payday loans).   
58. See supra note 57.  
59. See infra Section IV.B.2, for a discussion of the behavioral economics literature on risk 
preferences. 
60. See, e.g., WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 1; WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, 
at 3; CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., END OF THE RAPID RIP-OFF: AN EPILOGUE FOR 
QUICKIE TAX LOANS (2011) [hereinafter WU, END OF THE RAPID RIP-OFF: AN EPILOGUE FOR 
QUICKIE TAX LOANS]; CHI CHI WU ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TAX PREPARERS TAKE A 
BITE OUT OF REFUNDS: MYSTERY SHOPPER TEST EXPOSES REFUND ANTICIPATION LOAN ABUSES IN 
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savings or cushion of resources.  These financial products, while objectionable 
to consumer advocates because of the high rates of interest or usurious nature, 
exist because of market demand by consumers.  Empirical research shows that 
taxpayers are more likely to file returns and claim refundable tax credits to 
which they are entitled when loan products are available to make refunds more 
quickly accessible.61  The following is a brief description of the most common 
products: RALs, RACs, and the application of the anticipated refund to 
consumer goods by fringe preparers, and the problems associated with those 
products.   
Refund Anticipated Loans 
RALs are short-term, high interest-rate loans issued from a financial 
institution and secured by the expected refund.62  RALs allow taxpayers to 
accelerate receipt of their refund and defer payment of the cost of return 
preparation.63  A taxpayer borrows against the refund claimed on the return and 
is obligated to repay the loaned amount.64  A RAL lender issues the anticipated 
refund amount, less tax return preparation fees and filing, finance, and 
processing charges.65  Then, the IRS refund is directly transferred to the lender 
to repay the loan and any interest.66  Regulations prohibit tax return preparers 
from actually issuing the loan directly, but the return preparers facilitate the 
loans by partnering with banks.67  Preparers and lenders developed 
 
DURHAM AND PHILADELPHIA (2008) [hereinafter WU ET AL., TAX PREPARERS TAKE A BITE OUT OF 
REFUNDS]. 
61. See Hayashi, supra note 51, at 3. 
62. Id. at 6–7. 
63. Id. 
64. Book, Refund Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap, supra note 12, at 99.  Traditionally, RALs 
were recourse loans.  See WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 7 (explaining that taxpayers/debtors 
used to be personally liable for repayment of the loans).  Current iterations of RAL products are non-
recourse, though it is not clear whether all RALs are non-recourse.  Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 99–100; see also Hayashi, supra note 51, at 6.  The rules prohibiting tax preparers from 
issuing the loans (or being related to the institution issuing the loan) are found in the IRS’s handbook 
for authorized e-File Providers.  IRS, HANDBOOK FOR AUTHORIZED IRS E-FILE PROVIDERS OF 
INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURNS 44–45 (2004).  The handbook also sets forth all of the disclosure 
requirements for preparers with respect to RALs.  Id.  One of these relationships is the “per-RAL 
compensation arrangement” under which “the preparer receives a flat fee from the lender, regardless 
of the size of the loan.”  Book, Refund Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap, supra note 12, at 100.  
Another type of relationship is a “participation arrangement,” whereby the preparer acquires a less than 
fifty percent share of the loan, based on an interpretation of Revenue Procedure 98-50, which allows 
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relationships that created an economic interest in the loans on the part of the 
preparer.68  RALs are usually made for a duration of less than two weeks, or the 
time it takes the IRS to process and issue the tax refund.69   
Over the last eight years RALs have undergone a significant evolution.  
Historically, the loans were incredibly low risk to the lenders because the IRS 
provided a “debt indicator,” which revealed whether a taxpayer’s refund would 
likely be issued by the IRS or garnished by the IRS to satisfy other outstanding 
tax obligations or unpaid debts such as unpaid child support or federally funded 
student loans.70   
Bank lender-issued RALs were once prevalent and especially popular 
among low-income taxpayers.71  The loans were controversial because they 
carried high fees and high effective rates, in addition to concerns that the fees 
incentivized preparers and banks to inflate the claims for a refund.72  Between 
2009 and 2012, banks left the RAL market or were forced out because of federal 
regulations.73  In 2011, the IRS stopped providing the lenders a debt indicator.74  
So, with these regulations in place, banks have stopped issuing RALs.75   
 
for such an arrangement because “the preparer is not the lender so long as it does not own a majority 
share in the loan.”  Id. 
68. Book, Refund Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap, supra note 12, at 100. 
69. See Hayashi, supra note 51, at 7.  Tax refunds are now usually issued within 21 days.  IRS, 
IRS REFUND INFORMATION GUIDELINES FOR THE TAX PREPARATION COMMUNITY (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p2043en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW#8-4ZZA].  Under some 
circumstances, the IRS may take additional time to review a claim for a refund.  Id. 
70. See Book, Refund Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap, supra note 12, at 105–06 (explaining 
the IRS’s Debt Indicator program). 
71. In year 2002, there were 14.1 million RAL applications.  WU, END OF THE RAPID RIP-OFF: 
AN EPILOGUE FOR QUICKIE TAX LOANS, supra note 60, at 8.  The popularity among lower income 
taxpayers, many who claim the EITC, is notable.  In one study, the median adjusted gross income of 
RAL borrowers was less than $20,000 and twenty-five percent of taxpayers with income between 
$10,000 and $25,000 used a RAL.  Id. at 10. 
72. Book, Rebirth of Refund Loans, supra note 17. 
73. WU & BEST, BIG CHANGES BURDEN TAXPAYERS, supra note 55, at 3; see Hayashi, supra 
note 51, at 11. 
74. Hayashi, supra note 51, at 11.  In the absence of the IRS providing the lender with 
information on whether the taxpayer applying for a RAL was likely to receive the refund or not, the 
RAL market shriveled up.  See id.  RAL applications fell by 84.5% in 2011 and the FDIC “notified 
RAL lenders that making loans without the debt indicator was ‘unsafe and unsound.’”  Id.   
75. Id. at 11–12. 
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Payday lenders and other non-bank lenders started to offer RALs after 
2012, but exponentially fewer taxpayers have applied for them since 2002.76  
The National Consumer Law Center claims the non-bank RALs are riskier than 
bank-issued RALs, citing an enforcement action against a non-bank RAL 
lender in which the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) alleged the 
non-bank-issued RAL had APRs of over 240 percent.77   
A market, however, continues to exist for so-called “no fee” RALs.78  In 
2016, a number of non-bank RAL lenders began issuing a purported “no-fee” 
RAL or an advance of up to $750.79  Although advertised as no-fee, preparers 
derive revenue through higher APRs, increased cost for tax preparation, or a 
kickback to the preparer on a charged fee.80  The tax return preparation industry 
promotes new loans to attract customers; what drives this industry is a 
complicated matter because, for some players, it is not so much about the 
preparation of returns as it is about the fees generated from extending consumer 
credit,81 while for others the loan products are designed as a marketing tool to 
attract customers.82   
Refund Anticipation Checks 
As the market for RALs evaporated, tax return preparers started marketing 
RACs.  RACs are temporary bank accounts, created for a fee, for the taxpayer 
to receive his or her refund.83  Unlike the RAL, a RAC does not facilitate 
immediate access to anticipated refunds, but it may accelerate a taxpayer’s 
 
 76. WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 5.  The IRS estimates that 12.7 million received RALs 
in 2002, while only 100,000 taxpayers applied for non-bank RALs in 2013 and only 34,000 applied in 
2014.  Id. 
77. Id. at 5, 24. 
78. See id. at 5–8.  There are also paystub RALs or pre-tax filing season loans, made before 
taxpayers receive their IRS Form W-2s, which are lines of credit, not secured by refunds; they have 
annual fees and interest rates on the credit issued.  Id. at 8. 
79. Id. at 5.  NCLC provides examples where non-bank lenders offer RALs through Jackson 
Hewitt and other tax preparation services.  Id. 5–8. 
80. Id. at 6. 
81. See Stacy Cowley, Tax Refund Loans Are Revamped and Resurrected, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/business/tax-refund-loans-are-revamped-and-
resurrected.html [https://perma.cc/ST2C-TPMN]. 
82. Id. 
83. Id.; WU & BEST, BIG CHANGES BURDEN TAXPAYERS, supra note 55, at 5. 
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access if the taxpayer does not have a bank account.84  The RAC allows a 
taxpayer to have his or her tax preparation fees paid directly out of the refund.85   
RACs are dummy bank accounts that are created by a financial institution 
and await the refund deposit by the IRS.86  Banks and tax preparers generate 
fees on RACs sold to taxpayers.87  Data on the prevalence and cost of RACs to 
taxpayers indicates that approximately “21.6 million taxpayers obtained a RAC 
in 2014.”88  RACs generally cost $25–$60 for a federal return plus $10–$13 for 
the state return, in addition to the cost of the return preparation.89   
For taxpayers with a bank account, RACs offer nothing more than a loan 
for the tax preparation fee.90  A question exists as to whether the deferred 
payment of the tax preparation fee “make[s] taxpayers less sensitive to the price 
of tax preparation” (and the problems that come with lack of transparency in 
tax preparation fees).91   
Use of Anticipated Refunds to Purchase Consumer Goods on Credit 
In addition to RALs and RACs, fringe tax return preparers offer taxpayers 
the ability to apply the anticipated tax refund to the cost of return preparation 
itself or to other consumer products.92  Fringe preparers use tax preparation 
 
84. See Hayashi, supra note 51, at 8.  IRS regulations prohibit the deposit of a refund into the 
bank account of the tax preparer, regardless of whether a taxpayer has a bank account.  31 C.F.R. § 
10.31(a) (“A practitioner may not endorse or otherwise negotiate any check (including directing or 
accepting payment by any means, electronic or otherwise, into an account owned or controlled by the 
practitioner or any firm or other entity with whom the practitioner is associated) issued to a client by 
the government in respect of a Federal tax liability.”). 
85. Hayashi, supra note 51, at 8. 
86. See id. 
87. WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, 3–4.  According to the NCLC, fees for RAC products in 
2016 by seven providers of federal RACs, ranged from $25 to $59.95.  Id.  The lowest price for a 
federal RAC was based on a preparer (Republic Bank & Trust) who chose to lower the price and 
receive no kickback.  Id. at 4. 
88. Id. at 3. 
89. Id. 
90. See WU & BEST, TAXPAYER BEWARE, supra note 42, at 2. 
91. WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 5.  Prospect theory in behavioral economics would 
confirm this proposition because people are risk averse if the prospect is framed as potential loss (such 
as paying out of pocket for return preparation) versus risk-seeking if the prospect is framed as a 
potential gain (such as having the cost of return preparation taken out of the refund).  See Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of 
Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 297–98 (1992).  See infra Section IV.B.2, for further 
discussion. 
92. See supra pp. 534–35 (discussing fringe return preparers). 
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services to attract potential customers and accelerate or increase the purchasing 
power of their customers.93   
Examples of fringe preparers are tax preparation services offered by “check 
cashers, payday lenders, rent-to-own stores, retailers, car dealers, and other fee-
based providers.”94  Fringe retailers or service providers seeking to capitalize 
on the potentially available funds generated by a tax refund may rely on third-
party tax preparation companies to assist with the technical return preparation.95  
Fringe preparers also may offer sales during the fourth quarter of a tax year, 
deferring payment on the consumer goods, based on anticipated refunds to be 
applied following the filing of the customer’s tax return.96   
4. Problems with Credit Products Facilitated by Tax Return Preparers and 
Existing Protections for Consumers 
The problems with refund-anticipated consumer credit products facilitated 
or provided by tax preparers are not dissimilar from general consumer credit 
products that are marketed to low-income individuals, such as payday loans or 
title loans.97  The problems can be characterized as products the consumer does 
not need; credit products with high rates of interest; or products that are junk 
themselves.98   
Tax preparers will often charge additional fees that serve no purpose aside 
from increasing revenue to the preparer at the expense of reducing a taxpayer’s 
 
93. See WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, at 5 (including examples of a car dealership 
offering to prepare returns for customers who lacked funds to make down payment and a shoe store 
offering a free pair of shoes with tax preparation). 
94. WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 18; WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, at 4–5. 
95. WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 19. 
96. Id. at 20. 
97. Payday loans are high-interest short-term loans.  PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, 
§ 5:6, at 368.  A post-dated check is usually written by the consumer in advance of the consumer’s 
anticipated pay check and the creditor promises not to cash the check.  Id.  The post-dated check 
includes the amount of the cash advance and service charges.  Id.  Payday loans are also referred to as 
cash advance loans or check advance loans.  Id.  They are very similar to the refund anticipatory loans 
in that they are advances of cash to the consumer based on anticipation of a payment.  Compare IRS, 
supra note 23, at 10 (discussing refund settlement products), with PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 
56, at 368 (discussing payday loans, including RALs).  A key difference is that payday loans are 
monetized directly by the consumer, whereas refund anticipatory loans are monetized by the federal 
government’s issuance of the consumer’s tax refund.  See infra notes 212–214 and accompanying text, 
for an explanation of how the third-party monetization of the loan affects the incentives of return 
preparers and taxpayers. 
98. See generally supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (discussing the types of products 
provided). 
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refund,99 and possibly from defrauding the federal government. Such additional 
or “add-on” fees may be labeled as: “Application fees; [d]ata and document 
storage fees; [d]ocument processing fees; [e]-filing fees; [s]ervice bureau fees; 
[t]ransmission/software fees; [and t]echnology fees.”100  The add-on fees are 
not for additional services provided.  For example, in a lawsuit brought by the 
federal government to permanently enjoin an individual from operating a tax 
return-preparation franchise business, the defendant business owner testified 
that such fees are “junk fees” and serve no purpose other than to generate 
additional revenue.101   
Refund anticipation loans and most refund-anticipatory credit products are 
covered by the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the regulations 
thereunder.102  Essentially, the TILA requires disclosures regarding the terms 
and specifically prohibits misleading advertising of terms.103  Critics of the 
TILA, however, dispute its efficacy in the high-cost credit arena.104   
B. Compliance Problems Associated with the TRP Industry 
In an ideal world, return preparers would serve as the “key ally” to the IRS 
to fulfill the IRS’s “dual mission of providing taxpayer service and ensuring tax 
compliance.”105  Unfortunately, the tax return preparation industry is blemished 
 
99. See WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 9. 
100. Id. 
101. United States v. ITS Fin., L.L.C., No. 3:12-CV-95, 2013 WL 5947222, ¶¶ 337, 358–67 
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2013).  For a discussion on the civil justice remedies of injunctive relief and other 
penalties against tax return preparers who perpetuate fraudulent or criminal schemes, see infra Section 
IV.A. 
102. Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (2012).  For a thorough discussion 
of the application of TILA to payday loans, see PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 5:6, at 368–
70. 
103. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 7.1, at 494–97. 
104. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The 
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 890 (2003).  Some critics dispute 
whether TILA has achieved the ultimate goal of protecting consumers by allowing them to make 
informed financial decisions:  
[I]n the market for high-cost credit, [TILA] has failed almost entirely in 
promoting price informed borrowing decisions among the most vulnerable 
debtors.  In the high-cost credit market, structural and market forces act, not to 
promote price competition, but to promote confusion and strategic lending 
behavior.  High-cost lenders have a greater incentive to erect barriers to price 
shopping than moderate and low-priced lenders. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
105. Koskinen, Protecting Taxpayers, supra note 16, at 5; see Danshera Cords, Paid Tax 
Preparers, Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation Loans, and the Earned Income Tax Credit: The 
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with documented instances of negligence to intentional fraud.106  Theoretically, 
the costs of errors made by tax return preparers should be borne by the taxpayer, 
the government, and the tax administration system as a whole.  In reality, 
however, the burden for inaccurate returns is mostly borne by the taxpayer.   
1. Studies on Non-Compliance 
Compliance studies performed by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), 
among many other consumer advocacy groups, have conducted mystery 
shopper tests of paid tax preparers serving recipients of the EITC nationwide.107  
The results of the mystery shopper tests highlight a culture of gross 
incompetence to outright fraud in return preparation and promotion of 
unconscionable financial products, with little or no regard for ethical 
standards.108  The GAO and TIGTA both found that the majority of returns 
prepared were done so inaccurately.109  For example, TIGTA found that only 
eleven of the twenty-eight return preparers tested by mystery shoppers were 
prepared correctly.110  Of the seventeen returns prepared with errors, six were 
 
Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparers and Provide More Free Alternatives, 59 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 351, 382 (2009) (“[T]he relationship between the IRS, return preparers, and low-income 
taxpayers [is viewed as] a partnership . . . [in which] most, if not all, of the downside risk is borne by 
the taxpayer.”). 
106. Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. IRS, supra note 15, at 3. As 
Professor Book notes, there are a number of ways tax return preparers contribute to noncompliance in 
overstating credits or understating income, including, among other things:  
(1) Ignorance or misunderstanding of the law . . . ;  
(2) Misunderstanding or failing to understand or learn the facts . . . ;  
(3) [Being] unable or unwilling to detect false or incorrect information . . . ;  
(4) [N]ot exercising appropriate due diligence to verify facts or information; [and]  
(5) Aid[ing] and abet[ting] in noncompliance by advising taxpayers how to 
misstate or omit income, or claim inappropriate excessive deductions or credits[.] 
Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 69–70.   
107. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: 
IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS 3 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, PAID 
PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS]; TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2008-40-171, 
MOST TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED 
SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 2 (2008) [hereinafter TIGTA, SIGNIFICANT ERRORS]; WU ET AL., TAX 
PREPARERS TAKE A BITE OUT OF REFUNDS, supra note 60, at 2 (uncovering repeated instances of 
serious tax errors and fraud in addition to disclosure violations with respect to RALs). 
108. See Olson, supra note 11, at 768 (analyzing these studies); see also Amici Curiae in Support 
of Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. IRS, supra note 15, at 3. 
109. See Olson, supra note 11, at 768.   
110. TIGTA, SIGNIFICANT ERRORS, supra note 107, at 2. 
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considered to have misstatements or omissions that TIGTA considered to be 
willful or reckless.111  The GAO report found errors in seventeen of the nineteen 
tests, including preparers advocating for claiming ineligible children for the 
EITC in five cases and inflating refunds by more than $1,000 in six of the 
cases.112   
By comparison, there are higher levels of compliance on returns prepared 
by volunteer preparers (such as IRS prepared, VITA, or TCE services) than by 
returns prepared by otherwise unregulated tax return preparers.113  That study 
notes, however, that its results do not reveal whether it is the taxpayer or return 
preparer who instigates the non-compliance.114   
2. The Costs of the Errors are Borne by Taxpayers, the Government and the 
Tax Administration System 
When a tax return preparer does cause a taxpayer to erroneously claim an 
EITC, the consequences of erroneously prepared tax returns are borne by the 
taxpayer, the government, and the tax system as a whole.115   
Costs to the government of errors made by tax return preparers can be 
categorized in two ways: direct monetary costs and indirect monetary costs that 
exact a psychic toll on the entire tax administrative system.  Direct monetary 
costs are lost revenue and increased enforcement costs to the IRS.116  Indirect 
monetary costs to the government are the immeasurable costs to the integrity 
 
111. Id. 
112. GAO, PAID PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS, supra note 107, at 21–23. 
113. Leviner, supra note 8, at 1120. 
114. Id. at 1131.  The inability to separate which of the two parties initiates the non-compliance 
is a challenge to determining the role tax preparers play in compliance, especially in light of research 
that suggests “taxpayers are inclined to seek out advisors who share their views of compliance.”  Id. at 
1132. 
115. Not all erroneously claimed EITC dollars are done so by tax return preparers.  See supra 
Section II.A.2. 
116. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-475, REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS: 
COMPREHENSIVE COMPLIANCE STRATEGY AND EXPANDED USE OF DATA COULD STRENGTHEN 
IRS’S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS NONCOMPLIANCE 1–2 (2016).  Data for 2011 show that the EITC had a 
27.3 percent net overclaim rate.  Id. at 69 tbl.5 (2016).  Notably, the GAO report breaks down the 
estimates on the error rate on the EITC by preparer type with the highest rate, 33.6 percent, by 
unregulated preparers.  Id. at 70 tbl.8.  This error report translated into more than $15 billion of 
improper payments.  Id. at 1.  Unfortunately. there is no way to separate the estimates for improper 
payments based on whether a return is prepared by an unregulated preparer or not. 
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of the tax administration system if compliant taxpayers perceive that other 
taxpayers are not complying.117   
The direct monetary cost to the government of tax return preparer initiated 
non-compliance is complicated by the policy objectives of the EITC, namely to 
serve as an anti-poverty measure.  If the erroneously paid refund serves to 
improve the well-being of a low-income taxpayer there may be no net detriment 
to the government.118   
The harm to a taxpayer who relied on a bad return preparer is multi-faceted 
and can be devastating.  First, a taxpayer may have paid inflated fees for the 
return preparation itself.119  As an initial matter, fees paid to tax return preparers 
can be extraordinarily high considering the relative simplicity of the returns of 
many low-income taxpayers.  Second, there are costs for the additional fees and 
interest for refund-anticipated credit products.120  If the IRS issues an erroneous 
refund, the taxpayer will owe the tax and may lose eligibility for the EITC in 
the future.121  Furthermore, studies show the government is not likely to enforce 
against tax return preparers, whereas the draconian penalties for the EITC that 
 
117. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature 
Review and Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 138, 138–40 (2007).  Perceived cheating causes erosion 
of voluntary compliance.  See id.  See generally infra Section III.A.1, for a discussion on voluntary 
compliance.   
118. Zelenak, supra note 49, at 1915. 
119. Protecting Taxpayers from Incompetent and Unethical Return Preparers: Hearing Before 
the S. Finance Comm., 113th Cong. 264 (2014) (written statement of Chi Chi Wu, Staff Attorney, 
National Consumer Law Center) (citing lack of transparency as the reason for “very high, and possibly 
inflated, tax preparation fees”).  In a recent study of mystery shopper testing, fees ranged from $37 to 
$427 for return preparation.  WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 14; see also WU, RIDDLED 
RETURNS, supra note 42, at 18 (providing a table with examples of tax preparation fees determined by 
various mystery shopper studies). 
120. See WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 2–8. 
121. See Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Those Who Know, Those Who Don’t, and Those Who Know 
Better: Balancing Complexity, Sophistication, and Accuracy on Tax Returns, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 113, 
133–34 (2013); Alex H. Levy, Believing in Life After Loving: IRS Regulation of Tax Preparers, 17 
FLA. TAX REV. 437, 448 (2015).  A taxpayer is always liable for the tax.  A taxpayer may, however, 
escape accuracy related penalties, I.R.C. § 6662(a)–(b) (2012), but if the taxpayer erroneously claims 
the EITC, he will not be entitled to claim the credit for two or ten years, depending on whether the 
error was reckless or fraudulent.  Id. § 32(k); see also Leslie Book, The Ban on Claiming the EITC: A 
Problematic Penalty, PROCEDURALLY TAXING BLOG (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://procedurallytaxing.com/the-ban-on-claiming-the-eitc-a-problematic-penalty/ 
[https://perma.cc/8KQZ-FBV5] (discussing the prospective ban on claiming EITC).  The tax return 
preparer also bears the risk of exposure to civil and criminal penalties, and in egregious cases, the 
government may seek injunctive relief against the preparer.  See infra notes 167–79 and accompanying 
text. 
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prohibit receipt of the credit in subsequent years have been enforced 
disproportionately as compared to other underreporting errors.122  In addition 
to these economic costs, there are additional costs to the taxpayer of the time 
and expense associated with responding to compliance audits and judicial 
review.123   
C. History of Attempts to Regulate Tax Return Preparers 
This section explores the history of regulation of tax return preparation, 
documents the IRS’s attempts to regulate preparers beginning in 2011, and 
reviews litigation challenging the regulations.   
1. Lead-Up and 2011 Regulations 
In the early 2000s, lawmakers introduced federal legislation to license and 
register paid preparers and RAL providers.124  The legislation did not make it 
out of committee, and the IRS pursued an administrative solution through its 
authority to regulate tax return preparers.125   
Congress authorizes the Department of Treasury to regulate the practice of 
representatives of persons before it, allowing the IRS to require good character, 
reputation, necessary qualifications, and competence before admitting a 
representative to practice before the IRS.126  Congress also grants the IRS 
 
122. See Book, The Ban on Claiming the EITC, supra note 121. 
123. Taxpayers who find themselves defending an audit or pursuing judicial remedies in cases 
where the IRS denies a claim for the EITC often must prove personal information, such as domestic 
living arrangements and child custody.  See Watch Out For These Common EITC Errors!, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/watch-out-for-these-
common-eitc-errors [https://perma.cc/RCU4-M39D].  The costs of responding to an audit or seeking 
judicial review include non-economic costs.  For low income taxpayers, those costs include 
relinquishing privacy of domestic living arrangements.  Hayes Holderness, Taxing Privacy, 21 GEO. 
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2013) (comparing economic effects of requirements of disclosing 
private domestic information with privacy harms from disclosure). 
124. See Low Income Taxpayer Protection Act of 2003, S. 685, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).  A 
similar bill was introduced in 2001, which also would have required paid preparers and RAL provides 
to be licensed and regulated.  See Low Income Taxpayer Protection Act of 2001, S. 802, 107th Cong. 
§ 2 (2001).   
125. See IRS, supra note 23, at 32–33 (discussing IRS’s findings before implementing 
regulations).  See generally Bryan T. Camp, ‘Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation, 140 TAX NOTES 
457, 457–62 (July 29, 2013) (discussing the history of Circular 230 and lead up to the Loving case).  
The 2011 regulations were published at Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue 
Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 32286 (June 3, 2011).  
126. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2012). 
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authority to discipline “incompetent” and “disreputable” persons subject to its 
regulation.127   
The IRS publishes rules regulating attorneys, accountants, and other tax 
professionals who practice before the IRS in what is known as Circular 230.128  
Historically, Circular 230 established standards of competence for individuals 
practicing before the IRS and contained methods and procedures for 
disciplining covered individuals who failed to meet those standards.129  
Generally speaking, the historic regulation of practice before the IRS applied 
to practitioners who engaged in adversarial proceedings and not to mere return 
preparers.130   
Based on a review of the return preparer industry and following the IRS’s 
strategic plan, the IRS attempted to expand its regulation of practitioners to 
include those tax return preparers previously not subject to Circular 230.131  The 
expansion of the regulations (referred to as the preparer regulations) imposed 
certification, registration, and continuing education requirements on any paid 
tax return preparer.132   
 
127. Id. § 330(c). 
128. 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2010) (representing the pre-2011 Circ. 230). 
129. See id.  A covered practitioner who failed to comply was subject to censure, suspension or 
disbarment from practice before the IRS, and monetary sanctions.  Id. § 10.50(a)–(c).   
130. See Bryan T. Camp, supra note 125, at 457–62, for a thorough analysis of the history of 
Circular 230 from its inception through the return preparer regulations at issue in Loving. 
131. In December 2009, the IRS published a report reviewing Return Preparers.  See IRS, supra 
note 23.  The IRS commissioned the review to follow objectives in its strategic plan for 2009–13 which 
were to “1) Strengthen partnerships with tax practitioners, tax return preparers, and all third parties in 
order to ensure effective tax administration; and 2) Ensure that all practitioners, tax return preparers 
and other third parties in the tax system adhere to professional standards and follow the law.”  Id. at 1 
(citing IRS, STRATEGIC PLAN 2009–2013 (April 2009), http://www.unclefed.com/IRS-
Forms/PubsForTaxPros/p3744.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9Y8-962E]).  Based on the review, the IRS took 
the position that taxpayers, tax administration, and the tax professional industry, would be better served 
through the regulation of the industry, including through registration, competency examination, ethical 
standards, and enforcement.  Id. at 3–5.  The IRS also took the position that, based on the shift toward 
reliance on tax return preparers and tax preparation software and based on studies conducted by GAO 
and TIGTA indicating that returns completed by some tax return preparers were inaccurate, id. at 5–6, 
and after surveying tax return preparers, the associated industry, federal and state government officials, 
consumer advocacy groups and the American public, id. at 6, “there [was] general agreement that tax 
return preparers and the associated industry play a pivotal role in our system of tax administration,” 
and there was widespread support to increase oversight.  Id. at 32–33. 
132. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.4(c) (2017) (requiring tax return preparer demonstrate competence on 
written exam); id. § 10.5(b) (requiring registered tax return preparer to pay fee to apply); id. § 10.5(d) 
(allowing the IRS to conduct tax compliance and suitability check on TRPs). 
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2. The Story of Loving and Its Aftermath 
In Loving v. IRS, three independent tax return preparers successfully 
challenged the regulations as exceeding the scope of the enabling statute and 
sought an injunction against the IRS.133  The D.C. Circuit held that the IRS 
impermissibly expanded its regulatory authority to encompass tax return 
preparers.134  The court’s holding was based on the premise that a tax return for 
a client does not rise to the level of engaging in practice before the IRS;135 the 
Loving decision was not on the merits of regulation of return preparers.136   
In the wake of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Loving, policy makers and 
scholars have supported the need for federal regulation.  The IRS has indicated 
that it is seeking a statutory fix to Loving.137  But there is not uniform support 
for a single regulatory proposal.  Recently, Karen Hawkins, the former director 
of the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), which oversees applying 
the standards of practice to tax professionals, opined that, given the variation in 
types of preparers and the roles those preparers play, a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to regulating tax return preparers is untenable.138  In the meantime, 
the IRS has adopted a voluntary continuing education program for tax return 
preparers called the Annual Filing Season Program as an interim measure, but 
it lacks any mechanism for competency testing.139   
 
133. 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72, 80–81 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(upholding the injunction). 
134. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1016. 
135. Id. at 1017–18. 
136. Id. at 1021–22. 
137. See Koskinen, Protecting Taxpayers, supra note 16, at 6. 
138. Karen L. Hawkins, 2017 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax 
Counsel: A (Not So) Modest Proposal, 70 TAX LAW. 647, 647–49, 654 (“I am less convinced that 
Circular 230 can serve as the guidance needed for the entire tax professional community.  The 
disparities in education and sophistication levels among the practice groups are huge.”).  Hawkins also 
addressed what she believes to be fatal flaws with Circular 230, id. at 652–54, and her 
recommendations for making the process more transparent, including giving the OPR more 
independence from the IRS.  Id. at 658–59.  This Article also highlights how tax return preparers for 
low-income taxpayers differ from those who prepare returns for taxpayers with greater income levels—
the incentives are different and the role of the tax return preparer is different.  Regulations of the 
industry should be tailored to fit those specific needs. 
139. New IRS Filing Season Program Unveiled for Tax Return Preparers: Voluntary Program 
to Focus on Continuing Education for Unenrolled Preparers, IRS (June 30, 2014), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/new-irs-filing-season-program-unveiled-for-tax-return-preparers 
[https://perma.cc/6A2H-HLH7]; see Koskinen, Protecting Taxpayers, supra note 16, at 6.  The 
program allows preparers to voluntarily take continuing education, pass a competency examination 
and be bound by professional responsibility standards.  1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FISCAL YEAR 
2015 OBJECTIVES: REPORT TO CONGRESS 71–78 (June 30, 2014).  The IRS lists the preparers in a 
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III. THE RATIONALE THAT REGULATION OF THE TAX RETURN PREPARATION 
INDUSTRY WILL IMPROVE EITC COMPLIANCE 
Most of the calls to regulate the tax return preparer industry are based on 
the premise that regulation will improve overall compliance with the tax laws, 
especially with respect to the EITC.140  As explained below, the premise that 
regulation will have significant effects on overall compliance is imperfect.141  
In challenging the regulation for compliance rationale, this Part explains the 
concept of voluntary compliance and the tax gap.  It also considers existing 
research on the connection between the actions of tax return preparers and the 
tax gap.   
A. The Relationship Between Regulation of Return Preparers and Tax 
Compliance 
Many policy makers, scholars, and practitioners have advocated for 
regulation of tax return preparers, such as by requiring return preparers to 
certify, register, pass background investigations, and fulfill continuing 
education requirements, as the means to improve compliance.142  Indeed, the 
IRS’s stated goal in promulgating the preparer regulations in 2011 was to do 
just that: improve compliance.143   
Some of these arguments for regulation to improve tax compliance have 
been based on assumptions that are not supported by empirical studies or 
evidence.  For example, one legal scholar writes that tax return preparer 
regulation, “costs the government nothing, since higher collections from more 
accurate returns should more than make up for the costs of the regulations,” but 
 
database available to taxpayers seeking qualified preparers.  Id. at 72.  The National Taxpayer 
Advocate has criticized the voluntary program because it is insufficient to protect low income 
taxpayers, and the IRS has itself acknowledged the limitations of the program.  Id. at 71–78. 
140. See IRS, supra note 23, at 2, 6 (“After consideration . . . the IRS believes that taxpayers, 
tax administration and the tax professional industry and related service providers will be better served 
through [regulation].”).   
141. See infra Section III.A.2. 
142. In addition to the IRS, many legal scholars advocate for regulation to improve compliance.  
See Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 171–73; Levy, supra note 121, at 469; Cords, supra note 105, 
at 355.  The National Taxpayer Advocate has supported regulation of return preparers as a means to 
improve compliance.  Olson, Tax Return Preparers, supra note 27, at 3–4.  Consumer advocates have 
also touted improvements to tax compliance as the basis for recommending regulation of return 
preparers.  See WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, at 4; WU & HERNANDEZ, supra note 28, at 1–
2. 
143. IRS, supra note 23, at 6. 
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provides no empirical evidence or data to support this claim.144  The tax 
compliance problem at low-income taxpayer level is more nuanced.  Professor 
Cords argues that reduction of EITC non-compliance requires, “consistent 
regulation of paid preparers and greater oversight of RALs, coupled with 
increased simplification.”145   
Admittedly, it is tempting to blame low tax compliance rates for taxpayers 
claiming the EITC on tax return preparers.  It is hard, if not impossible, to prove 
causation.  Tax return preparers are one of many variables in the tax compliance 
puzzle.146  To understand the effect of regulation of the return preparation 
industry on tax compliance some general background on how tax compliance 
is encouraged and enforced in the United States is necessary.   
1. Voluntary Compliance and the Tax Gap 
The American tax system is based on voluntary compliance; taxpayers must 
calculate, report and pay their tax obligations.147  Voluntary compliance is 
reinforced through withholding, third-party reporting, economic and criminal 
 
144. See Levy, supra note 121, at 469.  The context of this quote was to build bipartisan 
Congressional support for regulation.  The author argued that regulation is a “rare Democratic priority” 
that should pay for itself, id., and that “Republicans have long been tough on fraud in the EITC 
program; they should be drawn to an effort to crack down on abuse of the public fisc.”  Id.   
Another article stated that the “entirely predictable” consequence of failure to regulate return preparers 
are the errors on returns that, as a result, cause “large numbers of taxpayers [to] pay less than they 
owe.”  Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 171. 
145. Cords, supra note 105, at 355. 
146. As Professor Book has noted, EITC compliance is a complex and multi-faceted problem 
that includes the facilitation of brokered noncompliance by tax return preparers.  Leslie Book, 
Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective, 56 AMER. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (2007).  
Additional problems with preparers are that return preparers are incentivized to sell goods and services 
“that are monetized by the very refunds that taxpayers claim on tax returns,” and that creates a 
“temptation for preparers to facilitate errors.”  Id.  Further complicating the compliance problem is the 
issue of selection bias.  See Book, Refund Anticipation Loans & the Tax Gap, supra note 12, at 98; see 
also IRS, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EITC CLAIMED ON 2006–2008 RETURNS, supra note 49, at 
24 (highlighting that low overclaim percentages on returns prepared by trained volunteers may “reflect 
the effect of selection bias arising from taxpayers’ choice of preparer”).  One part of the problem is 
that the IRS does not have full information regarding preparers.  See Janet Holtzblatt & Janet 
McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 148, 170 & 
n.42 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).   
147. The voluntary compliance-based system allows taxpayers to structure their transactions in 
a way to minimize tax liability, within the construct of the law, but taxpayers must report their taxes, 
report them accurately, and pay their taxes.  See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810–11 (2d Cir. 
1934) (“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound 
to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase 
one’s taxes.”). 
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sanctions, and social norms.148  Voluntary compliance estimates for tax years 
2008–2010 are approximately 82% meaning non-compliance overall hovers 
around 18%.149  Rates of non-compliance for taxpayers claiming the EITC in 
2011 are slightly higher, estimated between 21 and 26%.150   
Rates of non-compliance are measured by estimates of the tax gap, which 
represents the difference between estimated total revenue that should be 
reported and collected and the actual tax reported and paid.151  The gross tax 
gap of $458 billion is based on three components: non-filing, underreporting, 
and underpayment.152  Relevant to the analysis here, $387 billion is the 
estimated gross tax gap for underreporting, and that amount breaks down as 
follows: $41 billion accounts for underreported corporate income tax, $81 
billion for underreported employment tax, and the remaining $264 billion is 
from underreporting on individual income tax.153   
EITC errors generate estimated improper payments by the IRS of between 
$11.6 and $13.6 billion.154  By comparison, filing status errors (such as 
selecting head of household as opposed to single) account for $5 billion of the 
 
148. See I.R.C. §§ 3401–3406 (2012) (requiring withholding of federal income tax); I.R.C. 
§§ 3101–3128 (mandating withholding of employment taxes); I.R.C. § 6041(a) (requiring third party 
reporting of payments in excess of $600).  Civil and criminal tax penalties are based on a traditional, 
economic or deterrence model; the penalties for non-compliance are essentially a carrot for complying 
taxpayers and a stick for noncompliant taxpayers.  See I.R.M., supra note 5, § 1.2.20.1.  There is much 
scholarship examining the roles social norms, signaling demographics play a role in a taxpayer’s 
decision to comply.  See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement 
in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1459; Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of 
Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response 
to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic 
of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003). 
149. See IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 
2008–2010, at 11 tbl.3 (May 2016) [hereinafter IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH]. 
150. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2012-4-028, THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND RECOVERY ACT 
REQUIREMENTS, at 5 fig.2 (2012). 
151. IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH, supra note 149, at 3. 
152. Estimated gross tax gaps for components are $32 billion, $387 billion, and $39 billion, 
respectively. IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, at 2 (April 2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B7XP-LXLY]. 
153. Id. at 4 tbl.2. 
154. These figures are estimates for improper EITC payments in 2012.  TREASURY INSPECTOR 
GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2012-40-028, The Internal Revenue Service Was Not in Compliance with All 
Requirements of the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act for Fiscal Year 2012, fig.2 
(Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340024fr.html#internal 
[https://perma.cc/32LZ-UFGD].  
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underreporting estimated gross tax gap (for a total of 1% of the total gross tax 
gap), and tax credit underreporting errors, including but not limited to EITC 
errors, account for $40 billion, or 9%, of the total gross tax gap.155  Those 
figures are not as significant as the gross tax gap for underreporting of business 
income, which is estimated as $125 billion, accounting for 27% of the gross tax 
gap.156   
2. The Relationship Between Tax Return Preparer Non-Compliance and the 
Tax Gap 
There are two problems with the premise that regulation of preparers will 
improve compliance.  First, because tax return preparers are not the cause (or 
sole cause) of high error rates in claiming the EITC, regulation of return 
preparers would not solve the non-compliance problem.  With respect to the 
relationship between tax return preparers and compliance, studies by 
economists and legal scholars correlate regulation to minimizing the tax gap if 
the question is legally ambiguous.157  EITC compliance is not an area of legal 
uncertainty,158 and there is no concrete evidence correlating tax return preparer 
issuance of financial credit with tax compliance.159   
Furthermore, while there has been an assumption that regulation of 
preparers would address the underreporting tax gap, the role tax return 
preparers play in compliance is complex.  As Professor Leslie Book concluded, 
“there is not one particular compliance problem associated with the tax system, 
 
155. IRS, supra note 152, at 4 tbl.2. 
156. Id. 
157. Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 63–64; see also Steven Klepper, 
Mark Mazur, & Daniel Nagin, Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax 
Preparers, 34 J. L. & ECON. 205, 210 (1991) (finding the impact of preparers on compliance is “a 
decreasing function of legal ambiguity but an increasing function of the frequency of unequivocal legal 
breaches”). 
158. EITC non-compliance is usually a matter of fact.  See Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, 
supra note 12, at 67 (analyzing and categorizing EITC non-compliance as improper claiming of 
qualifying children, filing status errors, or misreporting income). 
159. Book, Refund Anticipation Loans & The Tax Gap, supra note 12, at 109 (“Banks and 
preparers make money on this product [RALs].  Absent additional evidence, the fact that preparers and 
banks make money off the product does not necessarily create the kind of connection to noncompliance 
that warrants a banning of that product solely on the basis of the truism that people sometimes act 
improperly when they can earn money.  Research is needed to specifically consider whether the added 
speed associated with RALs emboldens claimants to act inappropriately and boost demand driven 
noncompliance, or whether the additional profits associated with the facilitating of RALs encourages 
inappropriate preparer conduct.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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but rather many different compliance problems that vary greatly by issue and 
type of taxpayer.”160   
The second problem with the premise that regulation will improve 
compliance is that even assuming regulation will improve tax compliance, any 
improvement would be relatively small because EITC non-compliance does not 
significantly contribute to the tax gap.  According to tax gap data for tax years 
2008–2010, errors particular to the EITC, such as filing status, account for a 
small percentage of the gross tax gap.  As previously mentioned, filing status 
errors accounted for $5 billion of the underreporting estimated gross tax gap 
(for a total of 1% of the total gross tax gap), and tax credit underreporting errors 
accounted for $40 billion, or 9%, of the total gross tax gap,161 so the dollars at 
stake with respect to EITC non-compliance do not justify the compliance 
efforts and enforcement resources dedicated.162  The tax gap associated with 
overstated claims for credits is not “as significant in terms of dollars,” but it has 
become a politically hot issue.163   
Because EITC errors are not as monetarily impactful as other errors to the 
tax gap,164 if the real goal is to reduce the tax gap or increase compliance, the 
focus should be on the underreporting of business income.   
Even assuming that regulation would have a positive impact on compliance 
(however small), the concerns about possible negative consequences on the 
industry of regulation of tax return preparers may not outweigh the benefits 
from a compliance perspective alone.  Opponents to regulation argue that 
regulation will not work to improve compliance.  Their central argument is that 
regulation of the industry is protectionist and anti-competitive and only serves 
to improve market shares for bigger players, such as H&R Block, Jackson 
Hewitt, and Liberty Tax.165   
IV. REFRAMING THE RATIONALE FOR REGULATION OF TAX RETURN 
PREPARERS AS CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Part III refuted the traditional assumption that regulation of the return 
preparer industry would correlate to improving compliance with respect to the 
 
160. Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 63. 
161. IRS, supra note 152, at 4 tbl.2.   
162. For instance, taxpayers claiming the EITC almost double their likelihood of audit.  1 NAT’L 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 300 (December 31, 2011). 
163. Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 49; Zelenak, supra note 49, at 1867–
69, 1874 (noting that efforts of compliance directed at the EITC are not proportionate to dollars at 
stake). 
164. Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 49; see supra note 161 and 
accompanying text. 
165. See Alban, Protecting Taxpayers, supra note 28, at 49. 
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EITC.  This Part shifts from critiquing the rationale of regulation for 
compliance to making a positive contribution.  The rationale for regulation of 
the return preparer industry ought to be reframed as a consumer protection 
issue.  In reframing the rationale, policy makers and scholars will be able to 
focus on low-income taxpayers as consumers of goods and services, and tailor 
regulatory regimes to achieve the goals of consumer protection.   
In support of this thesis, this Part first addresses one main objection to 
regulation: that regulation is unnecessary because of existing applicable 
penalties.  Finding existing applicable penalties insufficient to protect low-
income taxpayers, this Part next examines the triangular relationship between 
taxpayers, the government, and return preparers, and how that relationship 
cultivates divergent incentives.  Finally, it shows how regulation for consumer 
protection aligns with broader policies underlying the EITC and trends in issues 
that the working poor face in tax administration.   
A. Existing Legal Mechanisms are Insufficient to Protect Taxpayers as 
Consumers 
Opponents of regulating the return preparation industry make two main 
general arguments: first, regulation will not work; and second, regulation is not 
necessary.  In Part III, this Article addressed the first anti-regulation argument, 
that regulation will not improve compliance.166  To support the argument that 
regulation should be reframed as a matter of consumer protection, the following 
Sections respond to the second anti-regulation argument that regulation is not 
necessary.   
1. Existing Penalties That Apply to Tax Return Preparers 
In addition to civil and criminal penalties for noncompliant taxpayers,167 
existing penalties are intended to address deviations from standards of conduct 
by tax return preparers.168  Tax return preparers are subject to civil and criminal 
tax penalties for any errors made, both negligently and fraudulently.169  The 
government can also pursue injunctive relief against particularly bad 
 
166. See supra Section III.A.2, notes 157–65 and accompanying text. 
167. For example, penalties exist that the IRS can impose on taxpayers who fail to timely file 
tax returns or pay liabilities owed, I.R.C. § 6651 (2012), who negligently report understatements of 
tax, id. § 6662(a)–(c), and who fraudulently underreport income.  Id. § 6663. 
168. Opponents of regulation of return preparers also cite to the civil justice system as an 
alternative to regulation.  See, e.g., MCGARITY, supra note 7, at 28–29; Wendy Wagner, When All Else 
Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 694–95 (2007) (critiquing 
regulation through litigation). 
169. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6695. 
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preparers.170  So, opponents of regulation point to the myriad of penalties that 
apply as an ex post regulatory regime.171   
All tax return preparers, including unregulated preparers, are subject to civil 
and criminal penalties for improper conduct.  For example, tax return preparers 
are subject to penalties of $1,000 or $5,000 per instance for understating a 
taxpayer’s liability if the understatement is due to negligence or willful conduct, 
respectively.172  Civil penalties also apply if a return preparer fails to provide a 
copy of a return to a taxpayer, sign the return, furnish an identifying number, 
retain copies or a list of refunds filed, or file correct information about each tax 
preparer employed.173  If a tax return preparer negotiates a taxpayer’s refund 
check, the preparer is liable for a $500-per-check penalty.174  Special penalties 
also apply for errors with respect to failing to be diligent in determining EITC 
eligibility.175   
Tax return preparers are also subject to criminal penalties for aiding and 
abetting an understatement of tax liability, improperly disclosing or using 
return information, or willfully preparing false or fraudulent documents.176  The 
criminal penalties range from $1,000 for aiding and abetting to $250 per 
improper disclosure of return information and up to $100,000 or three years 
imprisonment (or both) for willful preparation of fraudulent returns.177   
The government can also seek injunctive relief against abusive tax return 
preparers.  Federal law authorizes an injunction to prohibit a tax return preparer 
from engaging in return preparation in the future when the preparer understates 
a taxpayer’s liability, commits any other action subject to penalty, or engages 
in “fraudulent or deceptive conduct which substantially interferes” with the 
 
170. See id. § 7407 (government may seek injunctive relief against preparer to prevent future 
harm); id. § 7408 (civil action to enjoin specific conduct related to tax shelters and reportable 
transactions). 
171. See, e.g., MCGARITY, supra note 7, at 29. 
172. I.R.C. § 6694(a)–(b). 
173. Id. § 6695(a)–(e) (2012).  A penalty of $50 per failure applies, with a maximum of up to 
$25,000.  Id. 
174. Id. § 6695(f). 
175. Id. § 6695(f)–(g).  If a preparer is not diligent in determining EITC eligibility, the preparer 
is liable for a $500-per-failure penalty.  See id. § 6695(g).  
176. Id. § 6701 (aiding and abetting); id. § 6713 (improper disclosure or use of return 
information); id. § 7206 (willful preparation of false or fraudulent return or other document submitted 
to IRS). 
177. Id. § 6701(b)(1) (aiding and abetting); id. § 6713(a) (improper disclosure or use of return 
information); id. § 7206 (willful preparation of false or fraudulent return or other document submitted 
to IRS). 
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administration of tax law.178  Lawsuits to enjoin tax return preparers from 
preparing returns are expensive and time-consuming, and they are also an ex-
post remedy that has little deterrent effect.179   
2. Existing Legal Mechanisms are Insufficient to Protect Low-Income 
Taxpayers from Bad Actors   
Civil and criminal penalties and injunctive relief are intended to deter and 
punish wrongdoing by tax return preparers.  In Loving, the court expressed 
concern that regulation of the industry was unnecessary because of specific 
penalty provisions in the tax code that apply to tax return preparers.180  
Monetary penalties and injunctive suits alone, however, are ineffective tools to 
address the widespread problem, and they do little to prevent harm to the 
taxpayer.181   
It is unlikely that bad actors will suffer any consequence from the IRS.  
Enforcement rates for return preparer penalties are very low.  Statistical data on 
abusive tax return preparers shows that in fiscal year 2015, 266 investigations 
were initiated and 238 prosecutions were recommended by the IRS Criminal 
Investigation division.182  Of those 238 cases in which prosecutions were 
recommended, 224 resulted in indictments, and 204 resulted in sentencing.183  
Compared to the estimated 300,000 to 600,000 unregulated preparers184 and the 
results of the mystery shopper tests documenting widespread errors perpetuated 
by return preparers,185 the low number of investigations shows that the 
 
178. Id. § 7407(b). 
179. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
180. Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  As its fourth of six reasons for 
rejecting the IRS’s argument that the IRS had authority to regulate tax return preparers, the court stated 
that allowing the IRS to regulate return preparers “would effectively gut Congress’s carefully 
articulated existing system for regulating tax-return preparers.”  Id.  For further analysis of the court’s 
opinion in Loving, see Levy, supra note 121, at 459–62. 
181. See Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants, Loving v. IRS, supra note 15, at 
30–31; Levy, supra note 121, at 459–62.  With the exception of rules prohibiting a return preparer 
from negotiating a taxpayer’s refund check, the existing legal mechanisms are not consumer protection 
oriented. 
182. Statistical Data—Abusive Return Preparers, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/statistical-data-
abusive-return-preparers [https://perma.cc/U8AG-P6XD] (last updated Sept. 27, 2017). 
183. Id. 
184. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 26, at 270 (estimating number of 
unregulated return preparers). 
185. See supra Section II.B.1 (documenting pervasive errors by unregulated preparers). 
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likelihood of enforcement does not appropriately correlate to the rampant errors 
perpetuated by return preparers.186   
In addition to criminal prosecutions, court-ordered injunctions against 
abusive tax return preparers offer a strong solution to preventing the individual 
preparer from continuing to perpetrate fraud or deceptive practices.  However, 
as with criminal prosecutions, the likelihood of the IRS pursuing injunctive 
relief against bad preparers is also small.187  Injunctive actions are a highly 
resource intensive punishment for the IRS to pursue against a return preparer 
because such lawsuits require extensive evidence of the preparer's wrongdoing 
and multiple witnesses willing to testify against the preparer.188  Existing 
penalties and injunctive suits are insufficient and ineffective at protecting 
taxpayers as consumers.   
Even if the IRS were likely to enforce civil penalties on abusive preparers, 
the existing penalty regime ignores research on normative and cognitive aspects 
of tax compliance.189  Importantly, in the context of the EITC and other 
refundable credits, penalties designed to deter preparers from exploiting legally 
ambiguous positions likely will not have a deterrent effect because the law is 
not legally ambiguous.190  As Professor Book notes, EITC non-compliance 
relates to “relatively unambiguous legal matters dependent on accurate 
presentation of essential facts and practitioner understanding of complex but 
fairly unambiguous legal rules.”191  So, the existing penalties are not being 
enforced against abusive return preparers, and according to some scholars, 
would not work even if they were enforced.  
 
 
 
 
 
186. See Book, The Ban on Claiming the EITC, supra note 121; see also Section II.B.2. 
187. IRS data shows that from 2003–2007, the IRS obtained Court ordered injunctive relief 
against 175 return preparers.  IRS, FS-2007-12, TAX RETURN PREPARER FRAUD 2–3 (Jan. 2007), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-07-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/W34Q-U8W9].   
188. See I.R.M., supra note 5, § 20.1.6, for IRS policy on initiating and developing cases to 
enjoin a tax return preparer from preparing returns. 
189. See Kornhauser, supra note 117, at 138 (examining “tax morale” as affected by “procedural 
justice, trust, belief in the legitimacy of the government, reciprocity, altruism, and identification with 
the group”).  See generally supra Section III.A.1 (discussing voluntary compliance). 
190. See Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 48 (highlighting that differences 
may exist with respect to the efficacy of penalties for deterring tax planning versus errors by TRPs 
preparing returns for low-income taxpayers).  
191. Id. 
(DO NOT DELETE)  10/13/17 1:07 PM 
2017] CONSUMER PROTECTION RATIONALE  563 
B. The Triangular Relationship Between the Government, Taxpayers, and 
Tax Return Preparers and Divergent Incentives for Tax Return Preparers 
The government, low-income taxpayers, and tax return preparers have 
interests that overlap to some extent, but not completely.  Where the three 
parties’ interests diverge, market incentives exist for tax return preparers to 
exploit gaps in the law itself or the lack of enforcement of the law that would 
protect low-income taxpayers.  In addition to divergent incentives of tax return 
preparers, important informational asymmetries particular to the system of tax 
administration exist between the tax return preparer and the taxpayer that 
contribute to the market incentives to exploit taxpayers.   
1. The Interests of the Government, Low-Income Taxpayers, and Return 
Preparers, and Where They Overlap   
The government’s interest is in maintaining the integrity of the tax 
administration system.  Because the American tax administrative system is built 
on voluntary compliance, erosion of compliance is a serious threat.192  
Maintaining the integrity of the tax administration is no simple matter because 
the system itself has competing objectives.193  On one hand the government is 
concerned with collection of revenue.194  On the other, the government wants 
low-income taxpayers to claim social benefits for which they are eligible 
because the EITC serves important policy objectives of supporting working 
families, especially households with children.195  The government has an 
interest in paying the correct amount of EITC to eligible American taxpayers.196   
Taxpayers are interested in maximizing their allowable tax benefits and 
obtaining those benefits as soon as possible.197  Taxpayers are also interested in 
 
192. See supra Section III.A.1. 
193. The IRS Mission reflects this tension, which states the IRS must “[p]rovide America’s 
taxpayers top-quality service by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and 
enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all.”  I.R.M., supra note 5, § 1.1.1.2(1); see also Kristin 
E. Hickman, Pursuing a Single Mission (or Something Closer to It) for the IRS, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 
169, 173–74 (2016) (arguing to separate the administration of welfare benefits from tax collection). 
194. The IRS mission statement addresses this need to collect revenue indirectly, but states that 
“[t]he IRS’ role is to help the large majority of compliant taxpayers with the tax law, while ensuring 
that the minority who are unwilling to comply pay their fair share.”  I.R.M., supra note 5, § 1.1.1.2 
(2). 
195. For a discussion of the EITC as an anti-poverty measure, see supra notes 35–44 and 
accompanying text, Drumbl, supra note 121, at 120–23, and Zelenak, supra note 49, at 1903. 
196. With respect to individuals claiming eligibility for the EITC, the correct amount is not the 
smallest amount of tax, but rather the proper EITC to which a claimant is entitled.  See I.R.M., supra 
note 5, § 1.1.1.2 (1). 
197. See Hayashi, supra note 51, at 10. 
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minimizing their exposure to enforcement by the IRS.198  A low-income 
taxpayer may be interested in obtaining a refund that exceeds the amount to 
which the taxpayer is legally entitled, to the extent such benefits outweigh the 
cost of enforcement.   
Tax return preparers are primarily interested in maximizing profits and 
minimizing exposure to applicable penalties.199  Some tax return preparers 
generate fees for preparing returns and fees or kickbacks from facilitating credit 
products.200  Fringe preparers also derive profit from applying a taxpayer’s 
anticipated tax refund to the purchase price of a good or service that the preparer 
sells or provides.201  While tax return preparers may have an interest in 
complying with standards of conduct in preparing returns so as to avoid civil or 
criminal penalties, tax return preparers ultimately have no risk as to the tax 
liability of the taxpayer.202   
The three parties have somewhat overlapping interests, but for different 
reasons.  All parties want the taxpayer to receive at least the benefits to which 
the taxpayer is legally entitled and all prefer minimal enforcement.  The 
government depends on tax return preparers to assist low-income taxpayers in 
preparing returns and submitting those returns electronically.203  The 
government has an interest in the industry of tax return preparers to the extent 
return preparers (in preparation of the return or in providing credit products or 
both) incentivizes taxpayers to claim benefits for which the taxpayer is eligible.  
Similarly, low-income taxpayers depend on preparers to prepare their returns, 
and in many cases, accelerate the receipt of the refund.   
 
198. If the taxpayer claims an amount exceeding the proper allowance, a taxpayer is only 
concerned about enforcement to the extent it will cause the taxpayer to have to repay the erroneously 
issued refund or prevent the taxpayer from seeking the tax benefit in the future.  A taxpayer who relies 
on a tax return preparer generally will not be subject to civil penalties for the inaccurate return.  See 
I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), 6664(c)(1) (2012) (relying on tax return preparer is defense to penalty). 
199. See generally supra Section II.A, for a discussion on the role tax return preparers play in 
the tax administration system. 
200. See supra Section II.A.3. 
201. See supra Section II.A.3. 
202. In other words, if a tax return preparer inflates a refund and the taxpayer is audited or 
otherwise detected by the IRS, the taxpayer and not the preparer is liable for the deficiency in tax.  See 
Section IV.A.1 (discussing penalties applicable to return preparers).  Experimental economics research 
shows that tax return preparers’ behavior with respect to the positions taken on tax returns can be 
explained by prospect theory.  Kaye J. Newberry et al., An Examination of Tax Practitioner Decisions: 
The Role of Preparer Sanctions and Framing Effects Associated with Client Condition, 14 J. ECON. 
PSYCH. 439, 440–41 (1992).  Tax return preparers may be more likely to take a risky position on the 
tax return of a new client to attract the new client, but, with existing clients, tax return preparers may 
be less risk seeking because of the desire to retain them.  See id. at 449. 
203. See Book, Study of the Role of Preparers, supra note 12, at 46, 50. 
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2. Where Incentives of Tax Return Preparers Diverge There is Potential for 
Harm 
The problems lie where tax return preparer interests do not overlap.  Their 
desire to maximize profits may incentivize some preparers to inflate the amount 
of the refund claimed by a low-income taxpayer, either because it ensures 
repeat customers or because the tax return preparer’s fee is tied to the amount 
of refund claimed.204  The latter is especially true with respect to fringe 
preparers who have a direct financial interest in the amount of refund generated 
by the return they prepare.205   
Take the example of a fringe preparer who is primarily engaged in selling 
used cars but prepares tax returns for customers who wish to apply their 
potential tax refund to the purchase price of a car.  The preparer has a direct 
financial incentive to inflate the amount of the refund, increasing the amount 
the customer has to spend on a car.206   
The incentives of tax return preparers also diverge because the transactions 
between low-income taxpayers and fringe preparers are entirely monetized by 
a refund from a third party: the government.207  If the taxpayer is utilizing a 
RAC product, the taxpayer is not directly paying for the goods or services.  For 
example, RACs allow low-income taxpayers to obtain a loan for the cost of 
return preparation.208  As explained above, the RAC is a bank product that 
creates a temporary bank account into which the IRS deposits the taxpayer’s 
refund.209  Once the refund is deposited, the bank takes a fee for the use of the 
temporary account and a fee for the return preparation.210  Then, “[t]he 
remainder is issued to the [taxpayer] in the form of a paper check, prepaid debit 
card, or a direct deposit to the [taxpayer’s] own bank account.”211   
Fringe preparers and preparers who sell consumer credit products exploit 
the fact that humans behave irrationally.  Behavioral economics teaches us that 
 
204. See supra Section II.A.4, for a discussion of fee structures for refund anticipated credit 
products. 
205. See supra Section II.A.4. 
206. See WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, at 5.  The NCLC documents that fringe 
preparers, in particular car dealers, are supported by companies such as Tax Max that provide software 
and support for “businesses that want to prepare taxes ‘on the side’ to boost sales in their primary line 
of business.”  Id. 
207. See Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap, supra note 146, at 1175 (noting that this third-
party payer structure “creates a strong temptation for preparers to facilitate errors”). 
208. See WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, at 6 n.16. 
209. Id.  See generally infra Section II.A.3 (discussing RACs). 
210. WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, at 6 n.16. 
211. Id. 
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taxpayers are willing to pay a higher fee for the same tax preparation services 
if that fee is not paid out of pocket and is instead monetized by the refund 
itself.212  If a taxpayer must pay return preparation fees out of her pocket, the 
taxpayer will not tolerate the higher cost that she would if the fees were taken 
out of the refund itself.213  These preferences reflect the fact that taxpayers view 
the same dollar cost for the fee differently depending on whether they perceive 
the cost as a potential gain (paid out of the refund proceeds) or a potential loss 
(paid out of pocket).214   
The divergent incentives of tax return preparers arise because preparers 
have a financial interest in the refund amount and because the fees and products 
purchased by taxpayers are monetized by a third-party payor (the IRS), and 
these incentives create potential for harm.  Regulation as a matter of consumer 
protection is necessary to mitigate that potential for harm.215   
Informational asymmetries particular to tax administration also require 
regulation to protect low-income taxpayers.  Tax return preparers’ divergent 
incentives foster manipulative and exploitative business practices that 
capitalize on the informational asymmetries between the taxpayer and the 
preparer.216  These asymmetries reflect the fact that the provider of services has 
 
212. This unique, third-party payer relationship creates heightened need for consumer protection 
based on what behavioral economics instructs with respect to human behavior and assumption of risk.  
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 91, at 297–98 (finding risk assumption varies when framing the 
transaction as potential gain rather than potential loss).  “Two central assumptions in [cumulative 
prospect theory] are that individuals are risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses, that they 
tend to overweight low-probability events while underweighting the likelihood of high-probability 
ones.”  William T. Harbaugh et al., The Fourfold Pattern of Risk Attitudes in Choice and Pricing Tasks, 
120 ECON. J. 595, 595 (2010). 
213. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 91; Harbaugh et al., supra note 212, at 
595. 
214. See generally Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 91; Harbaugh et al., supra note 212, at 
595.  
215. Data, in fact, does not support the proposition that lower income taxpayers claiming the 
EITC who rely on unregulated return preparers, as opposed to self-preparing their returns, are more 
likely to overclaim the amount of the EITC.  IRS, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EITC CLAIMED ON 
2006–2008 RETURNS, supra note 49, at 24.  However, the nature of the relationship between a taxpayer 
and the preparer where the preparer’s profits are directly tied to the amount of the refund justifies 
regulation because the taxpayer is uniquely unable to otherwise protect herself. 
216. Book, Bureaucratic Oppression and the Tax System, supra note 36, at 587. 
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better information than the other party regarding the quality of the services.217  
This imbalance of information can create a market failure.218   
Informational asymmetries exist because providers of specialized services 
tend to have more information than consumers regarding the quality of the 
services.219  The more an informational asymmetry exists between consumers 
and providers of services, the more likely that lower quality services will drive 
out those of higher quality from the market.220  Economic literature suggests 
that for the market of professional services, such as preparation of tax returns, 
occupational regulation may protect consumers from bad actors because of the 
potential informational asymmetries.221   
Like any consumer transaction involving specialized, technical services, 
tax return preparers have more information about the return preparation process 
than the taxpayers they serve.  These informational asymmetries are basic 
informational shortfalls which arise because low-income taxpayers who seek 
EITC or other refundable credits are often vulnerable consumers.222  Low-
income taxpayers may have limited literacy skills or limited English language 
proficiency, lack sophistication with financial transactions, and lack knowledge 
of free or lower cost filing options.223  Furthermore, as the economic literature 
suggests, the demand by low-income taxpayers seeking refund anticipated 
credit products highlights the lack of bargaining power many low-income 
taxpayers have with respect to return preparation services.224   
As vulnerable or unsophisticated consumers, low-income taxpayers are at 
a disadvantage because of the lack of transparency of fees for return preparation 
and costs associated with refund anticipated credit products.  Traditionally, 
regulation has been used to address these types of informational asymmetries 
 
217. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare 
Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 946–47 (1963); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, 
Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1329 (1979). 
218. See supra note 217.   
219. Law & Kim, supra note 7, at 724–25. 
220. Id. 
221. See, e.g., id.  For its application in other areas of consumer protection law, see Wagner, 
supra note 168, at 695–96. 
222. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 162, at 301. 
223. See id.; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
224. See Hayashi, supra note 51, at 9–10; see also WU, RIDDLED RETURNS, supra note 42, at 3 
(noting that for many low-income taxpayers who claim the EITC, it represents “the single largest sum 
of money that they will receive during the entire year”). 
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with disclosure laws.225  But there are non-regulatory approaches to resolve 
informational asymmetries, such as educational outreach programs.226   
In addition to the typical information shortfalls, the tax code itself actually 
serves to increase the informational asymmetries that allow tax return preparers 
to manipulate taxpayer decision making with respect to return preparation 
services and consumer credit products.  Laws in the tax code intended to protect 
taxpayer privacy have the consequence of reducing information available to 
taxpayers.  In particular, taxpayer privacy laws reduce the amount of 
information available regarding the likelihood of audit and enforcement by the 
IRS against particular return preparers.227   
Laws prohibiting disclosure of taxpayer information prohibit disclosures by 
both the government and tax return preparers.228  First, with respect to 
prohibitions on disclosure by the government, the tax laws specifically prohibit 
disclosure of “return information” by any employee or officer of the United 
States.229  Return information includes any information relating to the taxpayer 
identity, the nature of a taxpayer’s income, any credits to which a taxpayer is 
entitled, and whether the taxpayer’s return is, was, or will be examined by the 
 
225. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999) (“[M]andatory disclosure is an increasingly pervasive 
and important regulatory tool.”).  But see supra note 104 and accompanying text, for a discussion of 
inadequacies of existing regulations for consumer lending. 
226. See George B. Sproles et al., Informational Inputs as Influences on Efficient Consumer 
Decision-Making, 12 J. CONSUMER AFF. 88, 100–01 (1978) (measuring consumer perceptions based 
on varying amounts of consumer information).  An example of an informational solution to the 
problem of expensive tax return preparers are the provisions of free tax preparation by VITA.  For 
example, Alaska’s Business Development Center has established a Volunteer Tax and Loan Program 
designed to “provide[] tax assistance to underserved, hard-to-reach, low income rural residents of 
partner communities,” Volunteer Tax & Loan Program, ALASKA BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CENTER, 
http://www.abdc.org/program-vtlp-2 [https://perma.cc/B9LV-V7TJ] (last visited Sept. 24, 2017), and 
it does so with the help of sponsorship from the VITA and TCE programs.  Contributors, ALASKA 
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CENTER, http://www.abdc.org/contributors [https://perma.cc/JL65-4546] 
(last visited Dec. 24, 2017).  In 2017, the program prepared over 5,900 current-year tax returns, among 
many other accomplishments.  VTLP 2017 Program Results, ALASKA BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
CENTER, http://www.abdc.org/program-vtlp-2 [https://perma.cc/W38Q-V8Q6] (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018).  
227. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2012). 
228. Id. § 6103(a) (prohibiting disclosure of tax return information by the government); id. § 
6713 (imposing civil penalty for disclosures by tax return preparers); id. § 7216 (imposing criminal 
penalty for disclosures by tax return preparers). 
229. Id. § 6103(a). 
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IRS.230  Parallel rules exist to prevent disclosure by tax return preparers of 
return information.231   
The consequence of these prohibitions is that the government and return 
preparers are restricted in disclosing qualitative and quantitative information 
regarding the returns actually prepared by the return preparers.  The laws 
prohibiting disclosures are a double whammy against taxpayers as consumers.  
First, the rules prohibiting disclosures by tax return preparers prevent ethical 
preparers from signaling the high quality of their services to taxpayers.232  
Signaling itself is a non-regulatory tool that corrects informational 
asymmetries.233  An ethical preparer who could advertise specific information 
regarding the high quality and low-likelihood of adverse enforcement would 
signal to taxpayers that she is an ethical preparer.  Second, the laws prohibiting 
disclosures protect abusive return preparers who can hide their malfeasance 
from taxpayer clients under the guise of mandatory non-disclosures.234   
Compounding the problems of lack of disclosure by tax return preparers, 
the limitations on disclosure by the government mean that there is no 
mechanism to check or corroborate return preparer information.  Because of 
these limitations, a taxpayer as a consumer is blind as to a tax return preparer’s 
quality and competence.235   
Treasury regulations provide some exceptions to the imposition of penalties 
against return preparers making disclosures in certain situations.236  For 
example, the regulations provide that return preparers can produce statistical 
 
230. Id. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (defining “return information,” broadly to include “a taxpayer’s 
identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, 
credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax 
payments”). 
231. See id. §§ 6713, 7216.  Prohibition against disclosure by the return preparer is enforced via 
civil and criminal penalties, respectively.  Id. 
232. See generally id. 
233. See Akerlof, Market for Lemons, supra note 217, at 499–500. 
234. See generally I.R.C. §§ 6713, 7216. 
235. This is particularly important because many audits are infected audits that stem from the 
IRS auditing all returns prepared by a tax return preparer who is being investigated or will be 
investigated for abusive behavior.  See I.R.M., supra note 5, § 4.1.10.3 (providing procedures for 
initiating “Program Action Cases (PAC)”).  The I.R.M. provides for the enforcement of return preparer 
penalties against preparers who have made errors on a number of returns.  See id. § 4.1.10.7.1(2)(b).  
The IRS investigates such return preparers, initiating the PACs against preparers based on a number 
of factors, including widespread errors made on returns, the number of affected client/taxpayers, the 
dollar amounts of tax errors, and prior compliance problems of the return preparers.  Id. § 4.1.10.3.2(2).  
These investigations will examine a sample of 30 client returns.  Id. § 4.1.10.3.6.  Taxpayers have no 
way to find out if their return preparer is subject to a PAC or other preparer investigation. 
236. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7216-2 (2017). 
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compilations of data for the purpose of supporting their return preparation 
business.237  Those statistical compilations can be used for marketing and 
advertising purposes, so long as the advertising is not false or misleading and 
does not contain average dollar amounts of tax refunds secured for clients.238  
Return preparers can also disclose return information if the information is for 
peer or quality reviews undertaken to evaluate and improve the quality of the 
returns by the preparer by certain qualified practitioners.239  With these 
exceptions Treasury has created an opening for possibly expanding the 
exceptions to prohibitions of disclosure.  Treasury could liberalize the 
exceptions further to make clear that ethical preparers can send signals to tax 
return preparers.   
A regulatory fix will not completely resolve the issue.  The regulations do 
not provide any obvious regulatory fix to the problem that abusive preparers 
can hide behind the non-disclosure rules as a shield.  There are likewise no 
regulations or interpretations under the prohibitions against government 
disclosures that would allow for the government to confirm or negate a tax 
return preparer’s assertions of quality.   
A lack of transparency regarding the cost of return preparation and lack of 
consumer understanding of the services being provided are other informational 
asymmetries.240  Moreover, there is a lack of transparency with respect to 
refund-anticipated credit products, costs to the taxpayer, and other 
alternatives.241  The domino effect is that, in addition to any compliance 
problems they might have, taxpayers are marketed exploitive loans and sold 
products they may not need. 
C. Regulation for Consumer Protection Aligns with the Policies Underlying 
the EITC   
Regulating return preparers as a matter of consumer protection aligns with 
the broader policies underlying refundable tax credits aimed at the working 
poor.242  As the federal government moved away from traditional means based 
 
237. Id. § 301.7216-2(o). 
238. Id. § 301.7216-2(o)(1), (3). 
239. Id. § 301.7216-2(p). 
240. Circ. 230 prohibits preparation of a return on contingency fee basis.  See 31 C.F.R. 
§§ 10.27(b)–(c) (2017). 
241. See Cords, supra note 105, at 390 (arguing for more education of free options for return 
preparation and education on consumer credit products). 
242. Other scholars have argued for similar policy alignments.  See generally Drumbl, supra 
note 121 (arguing penalties for error on EITC should align with policies for the IRS administering 
social benefits through the tax code). 
(DO NOT DELETE)  10/13/17 1:07 PM 
2017] CONSUMER PROTECTION RATIONALE  571 
welfare in the early 1990s and toward a welfare-to-work model administered 
through the tax code, the government has moved private actors into the role of 
determining eligibility for government subsidies.243  The government relies on 
return preparers to serve as the intermediary and has essentially created a 
demand for return preparation services for the working poor, so it ought to 
protect those same taxpayers from the potential for abuse that exists by way of 
the divergent incentives.  Absent regulation, the government is essentially 
setting up some of the most vulnerable members of society to be exploited by 
abusive return preparers.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Existing scholarship has long focused on how unregulated tax return 
preparers pose a threat to the tax administration system, specifically to tax 
compliance.  Instead of focusing on regulation of the industry to improve tax 
compliance, tax return preparers should be regulated as a matter of consumer 
protection.  The government has created the market for tax return preparers to 
assist low-income taxpayers in claiming government anti-poverty measures 
administered through the tax code.  In doing so, tax return preparers have 
diverging incentives that foster abusive practices.  Regulating for consumer 
protection benefits low-income taxpayers.  It also achieves the policy reasons 
behind the EITC, and it may also benefit the government.   
Re-framing the goal of regulation from improving tax compliance to 
protecting low-income taxpayers as consumers will change the types of 
regulations.244  Instead of focusing on the accuracy of the returns, regulations 
will need to address the full spectrum of services return preparers provide to 
low-income taxpayers.  Regulations may need to be tailored to the types of 
return preparers.  The incentives of fringe preparers are different from those of 
businesses primarily engaged in the return preparation business.  Furthermore, 
a consumer protection focus will ensure that the regulations are holistic in 
approach, encompassing refund anticipatory credit products as well as return 
preparation.245   
 
243. See Olson, supra note 11, at 770. 
244. Scholars have noticed the connection to consumer protection.  See Cords, supra note 105, 
at 353 (“[P]rimary oversight of [unregulated tax] return preparers is imposed by state consumer 
protection laws.”). 
245. Interesting research on alternative regulatory regimes is already being done.  Borrowing 
from research on responsive regulations, Professor Book argues that shifting the paradigm for 
regulation of preparers from enforcement to front-end efforts, including personal contact, will be more 
effective than existing penalties.  Leslie Book, The Need to Increase Preparer Responsibility, Visibility 
and Competence, in 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 74, 77 
(December 31, 2008). 
